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Amy E. Weissman (801)237-1930 
February 10, 1995 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
3321 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Supplement to Petitioner Vermax of Florida, Inc.'s Brief. 
Case No. 940436, Vermax of Florida, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 
Dear Geoff: 
It was nice to see you and Pat again yesterday. Thank you for pointing out the 
revision to Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring citations to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved for appeal. 
As we discussed, it is not entirely clear how the revised Rule operates in the case of 
an appeal from a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission involving issues of law. 
Nevertheless, the following is a list of citations to the record where the legal issues 
addressed in Vermax of Florida's brief were argued before the Tax Commission. The issues 
are numbered as they appear at pages 1-2 of Vermax of Florida, Inc.'s brief in the section 
entitled "Statement of Issues and Standards of Review." All citations are to the record, as 
noted by the abbreviation R. followed by a page number. 
• Issue one appears at R. 0013-0015, R. 0149-0150, and R. 0181. 
• Issue two appears at R. 0153 and R. 0186-0187. However, the Tax 
Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not address this 
issue. See R.0004-0008. 
• Issue three appears at R. 0050-0151, R. 1078-0181, R. 0188, and R. 0197-
0198.l 
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• Issue four appears at R. 0148-1049, R. 0178-0179, and R. 0204-0205. 
• Issue five appears at R. 0066-0067 of the State's Pre-hearing Memorandum. 
The Tax Commission's adoption of the State's argument in its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, see R. 0007, required the Tax Commission to make 
an implied finding of fact. 
• Issue six appears at R. 0150 and R. 0197. 
• Issue seven appears at R. 0151, R. 0183-0185, and R. 0205-0206. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Mark O. Morris 
Amy E. Weissman 
AEW:md 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Tax Commission err by concluding that the existence of installation 
contracts relating to products that Vermax of Florida had already sold to out-of-state 
customers gave rise to sales tax liability? This issue poses a question of law, to which a 
non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) 
(1994). 
2. Did the Tax Commission err by failing to address Vermax of Florida's 
argument that its purchases of raw materials were exempt as wholesale sales of components, 
which were not otherwise taxable in Utah and did not become taxable when Vermax of 
Florida entered into separate contracts with independent contractors to install its finished 
products already sold to out-of-state purchasers? This issue poses a question of law, to 
which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
610(l)(b) (1994). 
3. Did the Tax Commission err in concluding that the statutory exemption found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) did not become effective until after December, 1990, 
and thus did not apply to Vermax of Florida's alleged "furnish and install" contracts? This 
issue poses a question of law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
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4. Did the Tax Commission err by concluding that Vermax of Florida's sales to 
and subsequent installation of products for out-of-state customers were not exempt from Utah 
tax as being in "interstate commerce?" This issue poses a question of law, to which a non-
deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
5. Did the Tax Commission err by impliedly finding that Vermax of Florida 
made sales to itself, in state, which products it then shipped out of state and installed? This 
issue poses a question of fact, to which a reviewing court shall grant deference if there is 
substantial evidence in support of the finding. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a)(1994). 
6. Did the Tax Commission incorrectly characterize the contractual relationship 
between Vermax of Florida and its out-of-state customers as "furnish and install" contracts 
when title passed at the site of delivery to the out-of-state buyers before installation? This 
issue poses a question of law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
7. Did the Tax Commission err by denying Petitioner's request for an abatement 
of the 10% negligence penalty? This issue poses a question of fact, to which a reviewing 
court shall grant deference if there is substantial evidence in support of the finding. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a)(1994). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the outcome of this review: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a), 1953, as amended (Addendum at 1 (hereinafter "A.l")); 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3), 1953, as amended (A.2); and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(12) and (33), 1953, as amended (A.3). 
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Utah Admin. Code Rules R865-19-20S, 29S, 44S & 58S (1994) (A.4, A.5, A.6, and 
A.7, respectively) are also determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Audit Division seeks to collect from Vermax of Florida an alleged deficiency in 
the principal amount of $63,134.51. The Audit Period ran from January 1988 to December 
1990. Vermax of Florida does not contest a small portion of this amount. However, the 
lion's share of the alleged deficiency arises from wholesale transactions and transactions in 
interstate commerce, which transactions are exempt from sales tax under the United States 
Constitution and Utah statute. 
Course of Proceedings 
Upon receiving a statutory Notice of Deficiency from the Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission dated November 25, 1991, in the amount of $86,260.24, 
Vermax of Florida petitioned the Tax Commission for a Redetermination and Agency Action. 
Vermax of Florida sought abatement of approximately $60,000 in taxes, $15,000 in interest, 
and $6000 in penalties, leaving approximately $4000 uncontested. Vermax of Florida filed 
an Amended Petition on February 5, 1992. A prehearing conference on the matter was held 
April 16, 1992, before Alan Hennebold, Administrative Law Judge ("ALT). On October 
30, 1992, the ALJ entered an "Amended Prehearing Order." A formal evidentiary hearing 
ensued on May 3, 1993, before the same ALJ, with an agreement that additional factual 
materials would be submitted by stipulation. 
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Subsequent to the hearing, on June 18, 1993, the parties entered a Stipulation (A.8) 
concerning certain uncontested factual matters for the purpose of facilitating submission of 
this dispute. The Tax Commission, however, did not refer to these stipulated facts, nor did 
it make findings of fact consistent with them. These stipulated facts are as follows: 
1. As to each of the contracts identified by the State 
Tax Commission in Schedules 1 and 2 attached to the November 
25, 1991 Statutory Notice, Vermax issue two separate bids to 
the prospective purchaser, each of which was located out-of-
state. One bid was for the sale of product to be incorporated 
into buildings out-of-state. The second bid was for the 
installation of such product into buildings out-of-state. 
2. For each contract set forth in Schedules 1 and 2, 
the purchaser accepted both bids of Vermax. Generally, 
Vermax then had the purchaser execute two separate contracts, 
one for purchase and the other for installation. When dealing 
with large general contractors, Vermax was usually required to 
sign a single, form contract. Whether separate or combined, the 
contracts required that Vermax deliver the products on-site and 
then be responsible for installation. 
3. For each installation bid included in the contracts 
set forth in Schedules 1 and 2, Vermax subcontracted the 
installation obligations to on-site, out-of-state contractors. 
4. For each contract set forth in Schedules 1 and 2, 
unless the purchaser of Vermax products specified otherwise, 
Vermax invoiced the purchaser for product and installation as 
two separate items. 
Agency Disposition 
On September 1, 1994, the Tax Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law (A.9). Based on the May 3, 1993 formal hearing and the subsequent submission of 
additional evidence and argument, the Tax Commission affirmed the Auditing Division's 
assessment of additional tax, penalty, and interest on September 1, 1994. 
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On September 29, 1994, Vermax of Florida filed its Petition for a Writ of Review 
with this Court. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner, Vermax of Florida, Inc., ("Vermax of Florida") is a Florida 
corporation that has been in existence since only approximately 1987. (Transcript of Formal 
Hearing, at Page 16, Lines 9 through 21). Prior to 1987, there was a Utah corporation by 
the name of Vermax Corporation (Id.). Vermax Corporation was incorporated in Utah and 
owned by Jerry Hawk, (id.), with whom the Auditing Division had prior communications 
regarding tax issues. (Id, at Page 40, Lines 11-15). 
Vermax of Florida's main business is the manufacture of custom-designed products 
built from a synthetic marble product Vermax of Florida manufactures and supplies. Vermax 
of Florida sells these products to customers in and out of the state. (R.202). Vermax of 
Florida's primary function is manufacturing. (Transcript of Formal Hearing, at Page 17, 
Lines 12-13). Its main products are countertops and shower and tub enclosures. (R.202). 
Vermax of Florida is known as a "supplier of bathroom products." (IcL at Page 24, Lines 9-
10). 
During the audit years 1988, 1989, and 1990, Vermax of Florida's business consisted 
primarily of manufacturing and selling its products. (R.202). The majority of its sales are to 
customers located outside of Utah, and the Tax Commission concedes that without more, 
those sales are exempt from sales tax. The Tax Commission also concedes that without 
more, sales of raw materials that go into the products sold to out-of-state customers are 
wholesale sales, and are not taxable. 
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In some of its sales, Vermax of Florida assists its customers in obtaining suitable 
installers, located in other states, that can install the purchased products. (R.202). Vermax 
of Florida does not maintain a division regularly employed to install its sold products. 
Instead, Vermax of Florida acts as an intermediary between the customer and a local 
contractor to ensure installation. (R.203). In such situations, a separate installation contract 
is usually used. (R.203). 
In the usual situation, Vermax of Florida sends out a bid on goods. Occasionally, 
when interest is indicated, Vermax of Florida provides a separate installation proposal which 
has no bearing on the sale price of Vermax of Florida's product. (Transcript of Formal 
Hearing, at Page 24, Line 17 through Page 26, Line 14). Even when Vermax of Florida 
bids on installation, purchasers often do not accept the installation bid. (IdL at Page 26, 
Lines 6-8). When a purchaser accepts an installation bid, the products are sold and delivered 
in the same manner as those delivered to a purchaser that ultimately arranges its own 
installation. (IdL at Page 47, Line 13 through Page 48, Line 4). The separate installation 
contracts require the customer to pay to the appropriate state any applicable sales or use tax 
which accrues as a result of this transaction. (R.203). For the particular contracts at issue, 
as well as all others of this type, Vermax of Florida never performed the physical installation 
itself. (IcL at Page 27, Lines 13-15). Nor did it take possession of the goods either in or out 
of state. (IcL at Page 47, Line 13 through Page 48, Line 10). In each case, Vermax of 
Florida subcontracted the actual installation of the already purchased materials to local 
installers. (Id, at Page 27, Lines 16-18; Page 44, Lines 15-18). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Throughout the course of these proceedings, the Auditing Division has not clearly 
identified what it considers to be the taxable event at issue. At times, its seemed to focus on 
Vermax of Florida's sales to out-of-state customers that included an incidental installation 
contract; at other times, however, the Auditing Division appeared to emphasize and try to tax 
the sale of raw materials from Utah vendors to Vermax of Florida. The Tax Commission, 
on the other hand, identified "three types of transactions: 1) Use of materials in real 
property contracts; 2) Sales made on 'exempt' without proper documentation; and 3) 
Purchases of personal property for use or consumption by Vermax." (A.9 at 2). 
On appeal, Vermax of Florida does not address those sales described as the second 
type. Only the first and third types are contested, and so Vermax of Florida addresses the 
only two discrete events that might produce tax liability: Vermax of Florida's purchases of 
raw materials, and its subsequent sales of products manufactured from those raw materials to 
out-of-state purchasers.1 Neither of these types of events, however, is taxable, and the Tax 
Commission erred in concluding otherwise. 
The Tax Commission erred by completely failing to mention, and rendering a ruling 
wholly inconsistent with, the facts to which the parties stipulated. Moreover, the Tax 
Commission adopted wholesale the incorrect statement that a potentially controlling statute, 
lFor the purposes of this brief, the transactions listed as first and third by the Tax 
Commission are treated in reverse order. Conceptually, the transactions listed third in the 
ruling are those that occurred first in time, in that Vermax first purchased raw materials in 
order to fulfill its contracts. These sales are hereinafter referred to as "first-category" sales. 
Vermax's subsequent sales of its manufactured products to out-of-state purchasers are 
hereinafter referred to as "second-category sales." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1994), was not effective during the audit period. 
The Amendment Notes to the statute leave no question but that the statute came into effect 
during the audit period. For these reasons alone, the ruling should be reversed. 
Moreover, the Tax Commission improperly imposed tax on the two categories of 
transactions, which were both tax-exempt. The first-category transactions, Vermax of 
Florida's in-state purchases of raw materials, were tax-exempt as wholesale sales, pursuant to 
Rule R865-19-29S of the Utah Administrative Code, and, by exclusion, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103(l)(a) (Supp. 1994). Moreover, these first-category sales were exempt from tax 
pursuant to section 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1993). Second-category sales of Vermax of 
Florida's manufactured products to out-of-state customers were exempt as sales within 
interstate commerce under Rule R865-19-44S of the Utah Administrative Code, regardless of 
whether Vermax of Florida ultimately agreed to assist in installation of its sold products. 
Because all of the transactions at issue were tax-exempt, Vermax of Florida was not 
negligent in failing to pay sales tax on the transactions at issue, and the Tax Commission 
erred in refusing to abate the negligence penalty. Furthermore, even if this Court finds 
Vermax of Florida liable for the taxes at issue, the negligence penalty is not warranted in 
light of the fact that Vermax of Florida came into existence less than a year prior to the audit 
period, consulted tax experts for advice, and was not aware of any tax deficiencies assessed 
against Vermax Corporation. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UNCLEAR 
AS TO THE LEGAL BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE ASSESSMENT AND DO 
NOT SUPPORT AFFIRMANCE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER VERMAX OF 
FLORIDA WAS A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR 
This Court should reverse the Tax Commission's attempt to tax sales in interstate 
commerce. In relevant part, as described above, Finding Number 3 suggests that sales tax 
was imposed on two distinct types of transactions: "purchases of personal property for use 
or consumption by Vermax" and "use of materials in real property contracts." The Tax 
Commission was thus concerned with two different types of sales, namely (1) certain of 
Vermax of Florida's purchases of raw materials from other vendors within Utah for use in 
manufacturing countertops and sinks to fulfill contracts with out-of-state purchasers; and (2) 
certain of Vermax of Florida's sales of sinks and countertops to out-of-state customers. 
These two categories track the transactions for which the Auditing Division assessed tax 
liability. The Conclusions of Law, however, do not explain which statutes or rules the Tax 
Commission used to affirm the Auditing Division's assessment of tax on the two categories 
of transactions. Instead, the Tax Commission merely recites the following provisions, Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 and Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S, without explaining how, why, 
or in what way they apply to the transactions at issue. 
The Tax Commission's perfunctory recital of controlling law oversimplifies the 
framework governing sales and use tax. The Tax Commission is correct that, as a general 
proposition, retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state are taxable. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) (Supp. 1994). That tax liability, however, is limited by the 
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United States Constitution, and by the exemptions enumerated in section 59-12-104, several 
of which apply to Vermax of Florida. In addition Utah imposes no tax liability for wholesale 
sales. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) and Utah Admin. Code R.865-19-29S (1994). 
Tax liability is further restricted by provisions within the Utah Administrative Code that limit 
the applicability of Rule R865-19-58S(A), one of which provisions also applies to Vermax of 
Florida. In discussing these limitations, each of the two categories of sales will be analyzed 
separately. As demonstrated below, both types of sales are exempt, regardless of whether 
Vermax of Florida was a real property contractor. 
IL VERMAX OF FLORIDA'S "FIRST-CATEGORY," IN-STATE PURCHASES OF 
RAW MATERIALS WERE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION BY RULE AND 
STATUTE 
A. No Tax Liability Is Imposed On Wholesale Sales of Component Parts 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1994) and Rule 
R865-19-29S of the Utah Administrative Code 
In its Prehearing Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition for Redetermination 
and Request for Agency Action, Vermax of Florida argued that its first-category sales, i.e., 
its purchases of tangible personal property used to manufacture the products sold out-of-state, 
were tax-exempt because they were wholesale sales. (R. 0153). The Tax Commission did 
not address this argument in its ruling. However, Vermax of Florida maintains that its 
purchases of components were wholesale sales and thus not taxable. It was error for the Tax 
Commission to ignore the issue and to treat the sales in question as retail sales, which poses 
a question of law reviewable for correctness. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
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According to Rule R865-19-29S: 
All sales of tangible personal property or services which 
enter into and become an integral or component part of tangible 
personal property or product which is further manufactured or 
compounded for sale, or the container or the shipping case 
thereof, are wholesale sales. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-29S(A)(1) (1994). By statute, sales tax is imposed only on 
retail sales of tangible personal property, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) (Supp. 1994), 
and by necessary implication, wholesales sales are not taxable. 
In the case at bar, Vermax of Florida purchased tangible personal property in the 
form of raw materials. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14)(a) (Supp. 1994) (defining 
tangible personal property). Those raw materials became an integral or component part of 
synthetic marble that was then fabricated into bathroom products, which were items of 
tangible personal property. For the sales at issue here, the manufactured products were then 
sold to out-of-state customers.2 The first-category sales were thus wholesale sales of 
components and were exempt from taxation. 
The Auditing Division appears to have argued below that because Vermax of Florida 
incidentally arranged with independent contractors to install some of its products already sold 
to out-of-state purchasers, Vermax of Florida's purchases of raw materials from suppliers in 
2Vermax notes with some concern that its purchases of raw materials required to 
manufacture products for sales within the state of Utah are exempt from taxation pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 1994) (exempting "property purchased for resale in 
this state, in the regular course of business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or 
component part of a manufactured or compounded product"). To the extent that the Tax 
Commission's ruling may impose a tax burden on component purchases for interstate sales 
while exempting those same purchases for intrastate sales, it may run afoul of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution, in contravention of Utah statute. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104 (12) (Supp. 1994). 
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Utah were somehow transformed from wholesale to retail sales, rendering Vermax of Florida 
the ultimate consumer. This theory is not supported by the facts. 
This Court has recognized that a manufacturer does not engage in a retail sales 
transaction when it purchases raw materials for manufacturing another item of personal 
property for resale. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 
1992). The Auditing Division does not appear to dispute that out-of-state purchasers who 
bought bathroom supplies from Vermax of Florida were purchasing items of personal 
property, rendering tax-exempt Vermax of Florida's purchases of raw materials because they 
were not retail sales. Yet in those few instances when Vermax of Florida arranged for a 
local contractor to install those products already owned by the out-of-state purchaser, the 
Auditing Division shifted gears, labelled Vermax of Florida a real property contractor, and 
deemed the first-category transaction a taxable retail sale. As explained more fully below, 
the fact that Vermax of Florida executed a separate installation contract for manufactured 
products it had already sold did not make Vermax of Florida the ultimate consumer of the 
final product or a real property contractor. Its wholesale component purchases were not 
taxable in Utah, and the Tax Commission erred in failing to rule accordingly. 
B. Vermax of Florida's Purchases of Raw Materials Were Exempt From 
Taxation Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1994) 
The first-category sales, purchases of raw materials from other vendors, were also 
tax-exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1994), and the Tax 
Commission erred in ruling otherwise. This erroneous ruling poses a question of law, to 
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which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
610(l)(b) (1994). 
1. Section 59-12-104(33) Renders Tax-Exempt Vermax of Florida's 
Purchases of Raw Materials Used For The Products Purchased By 
Out-of-State Customers 
By its terms, section 59-12-104(33) exempts from tax Vermax of Florida's first-
category purchases of raw materials. Specifically, it makes exempt: 
sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated 
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property 
located outside of this state, except to the extent that the other 
state or political entity imposes a sales, use, gross receipts, or 
other similar transaction excise tax on it against which the other 
state or political entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by this 
chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1994). 
Vermax of Florida's sales satisfy each of the statutory requirements within section 59-
12-104(33). First, Vermax of Florida purchased tangible personal property, in the form of 
raw materials, from vendors within the state of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(14)(a) (Supp. 1994). Second, pursuant to contracts with out-of-state purchasers, Vermax 
of Florida used those materials to make synthetic marble sinks and countertops, which were 
shipped to purchasers in other states. Third, once the products were delivered out of state, 
the purchasers incorporated them into their hotels or other buildings in the other states. 
Finally, after installation by an independent third-party, whether arranged by Vermax of 
Florida or the purchaser, the Vermax of Florida products became a part of real property. 
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Case law bolsters this statutory analysis of the sales and installation arrangements. 
The analysis of this Court in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 
(Utah 1992) shows that Vermax of Florida does not engage in a taxable retail sales 
transaction when it purchases raw materials to fulfill its contracts. Id. at 306. The taxable 
event occurs when the manufactured product is sold, kL, unless some other exemption 
applies to that sale. As demonstrated above, the interstate commerce exemption applies to 
Vermax of Florida's sales of its finished product to its out-of-state purchasers. The fact that 
Vermax of Florida sometimes subcontracts for installation does not alter this analysis. 
For these reasons, the first category of transactions was tax exempt, and the Tax 
Commission erred in affirming the assessment of additional tax. 
2. The Tax Commission Erroneously Concluded That Section 59-12-
104(33) Did Not Become Effective Until After the Audit Period 
In its Conclusions of Law, the Tax Commission concluded that section 59-12-104(33) 
did not become effective until after December, 1990, and thus did not apply to Vermax of 
Florida's alleged "furnish and install" contracts. (A.9, at 4). This issue poses a question of 
law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code Ann. § 59-
l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
The erroneous conclusion apparently stems from the Tax Commission's wholesale 
adoption of an error in the Prehearing Memorandum submitted by the Auditing Division. 
The Prehearing Memorandum asserts: "What the petitioner [Vermax of Florida] fails to 
realize in this instance is that that particular section of the Utah Code became effective on 
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July 1, 1991 after the applicable audit period." (R.0069) (emphasis original). No authority 
for that effective date is given. 
The legislative history of subsection (33) is difficult to trace. It appears that the 
language contained within the current subsection (33) was originally enacted as subsection 
(34), see Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (1989), pursuant to the 1989 amendment. See 
Amendment Notes to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (1992); see also, Tummurru Trades v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 n.10 (Utah 1990) (quoting same language and 
labelling it subsection (34) under the 1989 amendment). The 1989 amendment became 
effective on July 1, 1989. I(L Those same Amendment Notes, however, are misleading in 
that they state, "[t]he 1988 amendment by ch.69, effective April 1, 1988, . . . added 
Subsection (33): and made minor stylistic changes." Amendment Notes to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104 (1992), at 400 (emphasis added). It is not readily apparent whether the 
Amendment Notes were changed to reflect a change in the subsection numbers. 
Regardless of whether the effective date is April 1, 1988, or July 1, 1989, the Tax 
Commission erred in concluding that the statute did not become effective until after the audit 
period. The audit period in question is January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1990. 
Section 59-12-104(33) therefore applied for a significant portion of the audit period, perhaps 
for all but three months. As a result, the reference in the Prehearing Memorandum to 
Tummurru is misplaced because, in Tummurru, the relevant statute was not enacted until 
1989, well after the October 1, 1984 through September 30, 1987 audit period. Here, in 
contrast, the statute became effective during the audit period. As such, section 59-12-
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104(33) applies, at least in part, and the Tax Commission erred in reaching the opposite 
conclusion. 
III. VERMAX OF FLORIDA'S "SECOND-CATEGORY" SALES TO AND 
ARRANGEMENT OF INSTALLATION FOR OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS 
WERE EXEMPT FROM SALES TAX 
The second category of transactions for which taxes were assessed, sales to out-of-
state purchasers, was exempt from taxation because those sales were within interstate 
commerce. The Tax Commission erred in ruling to the contrary, and this Court owes no 
deference to that legal determination. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(12) (Supp. 1994), the state may not 
impose sales or use tax on "sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of this state[.],f This 
statute reveals the legislature's recognition that the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution prohibits state taxation of interstate commerce. See, e.g.. Union Stockyards v. 
Tax Comm'n, 93 Utah 174, 71 P.2d 542 (1937). Similarly, Utah law expressly prohibits 
taxation of interstate commerce, pursuant to Rule R865-19-44S of the Utah Administrative 
Code. As set forth below, Vermax of Florida's transactions come within the purview of 
Rule R865-19-44S, and this Court should reverse the assessment of tax liability. 
A. Vermax of Florida's Sales Satisfy Rule R865-19-44S's Three-Step Test For 
Determining When A Sale Is Made In Interstate Commerce 
Rule R865-19-44S was promulgated to delineate the scope of section 59-12-104(12). 
Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax ComnTn, 802 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1990). The Rule 
sets forth the following test for determining when a sale is made in interstate commerce: 
16 
1. the transaction must involve actual and physical 
movement of the property sold across the state line; 
2. such movement must be an essential and not an 
incidental part of the sale; 
3. the seller must be obligated by the express or 
unavoidable implied terms of the sale, or contract to sell, to 
make physical delivery of the property across a state boundary 
line to the buyer. 
Utah Admin. Code R.865-19-44S(B). The undisputed facts here meet this test. 
The Tax Commission does not dispute that Vermax of Florida's sales to out-of-state 
customers which were not accompanied by separate installation contracts were within 
interstate commerce. And the fact of installation does not change the essential character of 
the sales transactions. The sales in question satisfy each of the three steps under Rule R865-
19-44S. It is undisputed that the sales to out-of-state customers involved actual, physical 
movement of the sinks and countertops across the state line to other states. (A.8, f 1; 
Finding of Fact Number 6). The interstate movement is essential by definition: the only 
way Vermax of Florida can sell its products to purchasers physically located outside of Utah 
is to transport the products across state lines. The purchasers, usually hotels, do not come to 
Utah to pick up the products. (Transcript of Formal Hearing, Page 47, Line 13 through 
Page 48, Line 10; A.8, % 2). Finally, the agreements demonstrate that Vermax of Florida is 
contractually bound to deliver the sinks and countertops across the state boundary. (A.8, 
1 2; see, e ^ R. 0025 ("ship to Dedham, MA"), R. 0030-0034 (specifying delivery to job 
site in Peabody, MA within six weeks), R. 0091-0094 (requiring Vermax of Florida to ship 
to Springfield, VA within four weeks)). Thus, Rule R865-19-44S is satisfied, the sales were 
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within interstate commerce, and this Court should reverse to the extent the Tax Commission 
is trying to tax Vermax of Florida's second-category sales. 
B. The Tummurru Decision Does Not Support The Tax Commission's 
Conclusion That Vermax of Florida's Sales Were Not Within Interstate 
Commerce 
The Tax Commission relied on this Court's decision in Tummurru Trades v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), in concluding that Vermax of Florida's sales 
were not in interstate commerce. That reliance was factually and legally misplaced because, 
contrary to the Tax Commission's conclusion, Tummurru did not advance the same argument 
as Vermax of Florida and differed in its company structure and sales practices. 
Tummurru involved a company with two distinct arms, a construction entity and an 
inventory-maintaining entity. IdL at 718. The sales in question there occurred when the 
construction entity purchased and acquired items from the company's inventory. IdL The 
construction entity then installed the goods, with title to the goods passing to the out-of-state 
buyer only after the goods were installed. As such, the "purchaser" of the personal property 
was deemed to be Tummurru's in-state construction entity. IcL at 719. The company argued 
that it was not liable for sales tax on items its construction entity purchased from its 
inventory. Id,, at 718. This Court disagreed, concluding that one arm of the company acted 
as the seller because it sold items from its inventory, and that the arm of the company that 
installed the items in its projects was the buyer. IdL Consequently, the entire Tummurru 
sale of personal property took place within the state of Utah between two Utah entities. 
Implicit in the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact and in its application of Tummurru 
is the incorrect belief that Vermax of Florida, like Tummurru, made intrastate sales to itself 
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of products which it then shipped out-of-state and installed. This finding seems to stem from 
the Auditing Division's shift, in its argument to the Tax Commission, to the contention that 
Vermax of Florida sold its products to itself within Utah and then shipped and installed those 
products across the state boundary. That fact situation, however, is not evident or supported 
by the record here, and makes the Tummurru holding inapposite. 
All of Vermax of Florida's contracts show that the purchaser was always a distinct, 
out-of-state entity, typically a hotel. Regardless of whether the purchaser executed a separate 
installation contract, the fact remained that the purchaser ordered the items in question, 
which items were shipped out-of-state and delivered to the purchaser. Title to the goods 
passed to the buyer out-of-state, prior to installation. Vermax of Florida does not have, and 
therefore did not transfer the items from, an inventory arm, as in Tummurru. Rather, 
Vermax of Florida manufactured the products and sold them to out-of-state purchasers per 
the sales contracts. In short, the only difference between Vermax of Florida's out-of-state 
sales, which the Tax Commission concedes are exempt, and those sales at issue here is that 
here, Vermax of Florida arranged to have the purchaser's goods installed locally after title 
had passed to the buyer. Because Vermax of Florida is not organized like Tummurru, no in-
state sale between Vermax of Florida divisions ever occurred. 
At the time of installation, unlike the Tummurru installers, neither Vermax of Florida 
nor, for that matter, the subcontractor, had title to the personal property; the out-of-state 
buyer owned the goods. Moreover, unlike Tummurru, Vermax of Florida is contractually 
bound by the express terms of the agreements to make delivery outside of Utah; no such 
contract terms were described in Tummurru. Thus, Tummurru is entirely distinguishable 
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and does not compel the result the Tax Commission reached. For this reason, this Court 
should reverse the Tax Commission's ruling. 
C. Regardless of Whether Vermax of Florida Was A Real Property 
Contractor, Its Second-Category Sales To Out-of-State Purchasers Were 
Tax-Exempt 
Vermax of Florida disputes the Tax Commission's characterization of Vermax of 
Florida as a real property contractor. Nonetheless, even if this Court affirms the Tax 
Commission's finding on that issue, the sales in question were exempt from taxation pursuant 
to Rules R865-19-58S(C) and R865-19-44S of the Utah Administrative Code. This issue 
poses a question of law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
Assuming, arguendo, that Vermax of Florida was a real property contractor, Rule 
R865-19-58S determines its tax liability. In relevant part, the Rule provides: 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors for use 
in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold in interstate 
commerce in accordance with Rule R865-19-44S. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S. As previously described, Rule R865-19-44S prescribes a 
three-part test for sales within interstate commerce, which test Vermax of Florida's sales 
satisfied. Also, the record shows there were no "sales" from an inventory arm to a 
contracting arm of Vermax of Florida. Thus, the specific exemption to tax liability 
expressed in Rule R865-19-44S is met here, and this Court should reverse the assessment. 
This Court's decision in Thorup Brothers Constr. v. Auditing Div., 860 P.2d 324 
(Utah 1993), compels the same conclusion. In Thorup, this Court held that a real property 
contractor was not liable for sales tax on its installation of items purchased and owned by a 
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Catholic school, which was a tax-exempt entity under state law. IdL at 329. Central to the 
Court's reasoning was the fact that Thorup merely installed goods which it did not own. IcL 
Likewise, even if Vermax of Florida is considered to have been a real property contractor 
when it subcontracted installation of its sold products, it arranged installation of items it did 
not own. The out-of-state purchaser/owner, who purchased and took title to the goods at the 
moment of delivery out of state, is tax-exempt because of the interstate nature of the sale, 
just as the Catholic school in Thorup was tax-exempt under state law. This Court concluded 
in Thorup that the Tax Commission cannot impose sales tax under such circumstances. IdL 
Consequently, it is ultimately irrelevant whether Vermax of Florida was a real 
property contractor because even if it was, the transactions in question were exempt from 
sales tax by virtue of its non-ownership of the goods, and the Tax Commission erred in 
concluding otherwise. Thus, this Court should reverse the assessment. 
D. The Record Lacks Sufficient Evidence To Support The Tax Commission's 
Findings of Fact Underlying Its Erroneous Conclusion That The Sales 
Were Non-Exempt 
1. The Record Demonstrates That The Contracts In Question Were 
Not Real Property Contracts 
The Tax Commission's error stems in part from the finding that the contracts at issue 
were "real property contracts." (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, at 2, t 3(1)). This 
label misconstrues the nature of the contracts in question and is not supported by the 
evidence. Although denominated a "finding" by the Tax Commission, this issue poses a 
question of law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b)(1994). 
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As the evidence demonstrated, and more importantly, as the parties stipulated, 
Vermax of Florida always issued separate bids when a customer requested an installation bid 
as well as a sales bid. (A.8, f 1). Some purchasers accepted only the sale bid, while others 
accepted both bids. Some entities rejected both bids. When both bids were accepted, 
Vermax of Florida typically used two separate contracts, unless the purchaser required 
otherwise. (A. 8, f 2). Vermax of Florida then manufactured the products specified, 
delivered its sold products out-of-state and transferred title at that time and place. For the 
contracts at issue, Vermax of Florida also arranged for an out-of-state subcontractor to 
perform the out-of-state installation. (A.8, ^3) . The purchase and the installation 
arrangements were billed separately. (A.8, f 4). 
These stipulated facts demonstrate that Vermax of Florida merely transformed 
wholesale raw materials into sinks and countertops, which sinks and countertops remained 
tangible personal property when the out-of-state buyer took title upon delivery out-of-state. 
The Tax Commission does not dispute that products sold to purchasers who accepted only the 
sale bid, and not the installation bid, were tax-exempt sales of tangible personal property 
within interstate commerce. But the Tax Commission incorrectly implies that the separate 
installation arrangement changed the character of the sales agreements, and ignores the fact 
that title to Vermax of Florida's products passed to the out-of-state purchasers at the time of 
sale, regardless of whether Vermax of Florida arranged the subsequent installation. 
Vermax of Florida did not perform the physical installation of its sold products, and 
its sales were complete at the time it delivered the products to its out-of-state customers, 
prior to any attachment, affixation, or installation. The products never became attached to 
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real property while Vermax of Florida had title to them, and thus they retained their 
character as personal property at all times relevant to Vermax of Florida's potential tax 
liability, in accordance with Utah law. See Valgardson Housing Systems v. Tax Comm'n, 
849 P.2d 618, 621-622 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) (manufactured 
items are not converted from personal property to real property until attached or affixed to 
real estate). Thus, there is no evidence to support the legal finding that the contracts in 
question were "real property contracts," and the Tax Commission erred in characterizing 
them as such. 
2. The Finding That The Contracts in Question Were "Furnish And 
Install" Contracts Is Not Supported By Substantial, Or Any 
Evidence, and Completely Ignores the Parties' Stipulation To The 
Contrary 
There is also no record support for the proposition that the contracts in question were 
"furnish and install" contracts. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, at 2, f f 6-7). The 
"furnish and install" label is nothing more than another name for a real property contract. It 
implies that title to the good does not pass until the good is installed. Such a situation 
existed in Tummurru, supra. The stipulated facts here demonstrate that the contracts in 
question were not furnish and install contracts because (1) two independent contracts were 
bid and executed; (2) purchasers were not required to accept both bids, i.e., purchasers could 
arrange installation themselves; and (3) Vermax of Florida did not install the products, but 
rather arranged installation as a convenience to some of its out-of-state customers who 
desired that extra service. Prior decisions of this Court recognize that installation of goods 
does not change the essential character of a sales agreement. See Nickerson Pump & 
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Machinery Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 30, 361 P.2d 520, 522 (1961) ("The 
primary purpose of the agreements were [sic] for the sale and purchase of [products] 
assembled to particular specifications. The emplacement was incidental to such purpose and 
was a mere convenience for the purchaser . . . ."). 
In addition to the stipulated facts, the Formal Hearing Transcript is replete with 
testimony demonstrating that the contracts were not "furnish and install" contracts. 
According to the testimony of the only witness on this issue, Vermax of Florida's "primary 
function" is manufacturing. (Transcript of Formal Hearing, at Page 17, Lines 12-13). 
Vermax of Florida is known as a "supplier of bathroom products." (IcL at Page 24, Lines 9-
10). Vermax of Florida sends out a bid on goods and, when interest is indicated, sends out a 
separate installation proposal which has no bearing on the sale price of Vermax of Florida's 
product. (IcL at Page 24, Line 17 through Page 26, Line 14). Even when Vermax of 
Florida bids on installation, purchasers need not and usually do not accept the installation 
bid. (IcL at Page 26, Lines 6-8). And when a purchaser accepts an installation bid, the 
products are delivered in the same manner as those delivered to a purchaser that ultimately 
arranges its own installation. (IdL at Page 47, Line 13 through Page 48, Line 4). 
In marshalling evidence in favor of the Tax Commission ruling, Vermax of Florida 
submits that the only testimony conceivably supporting the Tax Commission's finding is that 
Vermax of Florida sometimes makes a profit from arranging the installations. (IcL at Page 
45, Lines 5-7). But the fact that Vermax of Florida aims to profit from arranging 
installations demonstrates only that Vermax of Florida strives to be a profit-making entity, 
just like other businesses, and not that it is entering into furnish and install contracts. Such 
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profits are also taxed as income by the State. The record is devoid of any other evidence 
supporting the Tax Commission's finding. Because the record lacks substantial evidence in 
support of the finding, this Court need not defer to the finding. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
610(l)(a)(1994). 
E. The Tax Commission's Factual Errors Led It To Treat Vermax of Florida 
As A Real Property Contractor And As The Ultimate Consumer 
Because the Tax Commission treated the contracts as "furnish and install" contracts, it 
incorrectly concluded that Vermax of Florida was a real property contractor. This factual 
error led the Tax Commission to apply Rule R865-19-58S(A) of the Utah Administrative 
Code, which does not apply to the stipulated facts here. Applicability of this Rule poses a 
question of law, to which a non-deferential correction of error standard applies. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (1994). 
Rule R865-19-58S provides in relevant part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally subject 
to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he 
is the last one to own it as personal property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair real 
property, regardless of the type of contract entered into — 
whether it is a lump sum, time and material, or cost-plus 
contract. 
Application of this Rule requires the presence of two facts that do not exist here. First, there 
is no "sale" to Vermax of Florida, regardless of whether this Court concludes that Vermax of 
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Florida is a real property contractor. Second, Vermax of Florida is not a real property 
contractor. The Rule applies to the person who converts personal property into real 
property, and assumes that the personal property is not already owned by the customer. See, 
Thorup, 860 P.2d at 329. Finally, Vermax of Florida does not convert anything into real 
property, but merely arranges for local installers to do it. 
Vermax of Florida's products do not become real property until they are attached or 
affixed into a building during the installation process. See, e.g., Valgardson Housing 
Systems v. Tax Common, 849 P.2d 618, 621-622 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993). Even when Vermax of Florida executes two contracts with an out-of-state 
purchaser, installation is always performed by an independent third-party after Vermax of 
Florida delivers the product and accomplishes the sale. At the moment the sale is completed, 
the products are in the form of tangible personal property and remain so until someone else 
incorporates them into the real property. In addition, at the moment of sale, title passes to 
the out-of-state purchaser. When installation occurs, title to goods is in the buyer, not 
Vermax of Florida. 
Because Vermax of Florida does not hold title to the items for which it subcontracts 
installation, it is neither a real property contractor nor the ultimate consumer under Utah law. 
As this Court explained in Thorup Brothers Construction v. Auditing Division, 860 P.2d 324 
(Utah 1993), an entity is not liable for taxes on property it installs but does not own. IcL at 
327. The out-of-state purchasers of Vermax of Florida's product are no different from any 
other tax-exempt entity, and mere installation of another's property does not give rise to tax 
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liability. The rationale of Thorup necessarily implies that Vermax of Florida was not liable 
for sales tax under Rule R865-19-58S. 
Additional decisions of this Court support excluding Vermax of Florida from 
application of the real property contractor rule. For example, in BJ-Titan Services v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), this Court commented extensively on the treatment 
given real property contractors. BJ-Titan provided oil and gas well stimulation and 
stabilization accomplished by cementing, hydraulic fracturing, and acidizing. Id at 823. 
The company delivered its products to well sites, at which point the well operators decided 
formulas and methods of placement in the well. Id. In considering whether BJ-Titan was a 
real property contractor, the Court observed: 
The different treatment applied to real property 
contractors is based on the proposition that building materials 
lose their identity as such when they become part of a building 
or facility. In other words, they are converted from tangible 
personal property into real property. The issue is not, as BJ-
Titan urges, which party to the transaction converted the cement 
into real property, but rather, who is the ultimate user or 
consumer of the cement. Because the essence of the transaction 
between BJ-Titan and a well operator is tangible personal 
property, BJ-Titan purchased the raw materials used in 
producing its cement not for consumption, but for resale . . . . 
The ultimate consumer is the well operator . . . . 
Moreover, a well operator is in the business of making a 
well produce . . . . It does not seek to purchase real property, 
nor does the cement become inseparably meshed into a greater 
facility which itself is the object of the transaction. From the 
standpoint of the well operator, who may or may not own the 
well, the cement has not lost its identity as tangible personal 
property. 
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Id. at 829. By the same reasoning, Vermax of Florida purchased the raw materials to make 
sinks and countertops not for consumption, but for resale. And from the perspective of the 
purchaser, the sinks and countertops did not lose their identity as tangible personal property 
until after the purchaser owned them. Indeed, nothing prevented the purchasers from 
reselling the products, moving them elsewhere, storing them in a warehouse, or otherwise 
disposing of them upon receipt from Vermax of Florida, and the arrangement of installation 
neither changed the character of the transaction or the products, nor converted Vermax of 
Florida into a real property contractor. 
Consequently, Vermax of Florida was neither a real property contractor nor the 
ultimate consumer of its sold products, and the contracts in question were neither real 
property contracts nor "furnish and install" contracts. These incorrect characterizations led 
the Tax Commission to apply the wrong statutes and erroneously affirm the Auditing 
Division's assessment. This Court should now reverse that assessment. 
IV THE TAX COMMISSION IMPROPERLY DENIED VERMAX OF FLORIDA'S 
REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT OF THE TEN PERCENT NEGLIGENCE 
PENALTY 
The Tax Commission erroneously denied Vermax of Florida's request for an 
abatement of the 10% negligence penalty. This issue poses a question of fact, to which a 
reviewing court shall grant deference if there is substantial evidence in support of the 
finding. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a)(1994). 
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Negligence penalties are authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(3)(a).3 Under 
this section, a negligence penalty: 
is appropriate when the taxpayer has failed to pay taxes and a 
reasonable investigation into the applicable rules and statutes 
would have revealed that the taxes were due . . . . [T]he 
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can show that he or 
she based the nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith 
interpretation of an arguable point of law. 
Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Div.. 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992). If Vermax of Florida 
prevails upon this writ of review, the penalty should be rejected because Vermax of Florida 
was not liable for taxes and therefore could not have been negligent in failing to pay taxes it 
did not owe. But even if Vermax of Florida does not prevail, the penalty should be abated 
because Vermax of Florida was not negligent and because Vermax of Florida based its 
nonpayment on a good faith construction of the sales tax law. This Court has observed that 
"[w]hether a taxpayer is a real property contractor for sales tax purposes usually is fact 
sensitive." Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992). If 
Vermax of Florida is a real property contractor, and its interpretation of the relevant rules 
and statutes is proven incorrect on appeal, the fact of its error does not require imposition of 
a penalty. IdL (construing penalty imposed for intentional disregard of rule4 and noting that 
taxpayer's arguments as to liability demonstrated good faith dispute, although position was 
3Pursuant to the 1994 Amendments, Subsection 3 has been redesignated as Subsection 5. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(5)(a)(i) (Supp, 1994), and Amendment Notes thereto. 
4A penalty assessed due to intentional underpayment implicates the same standard as a 
negligence penalty. See Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 
1992). 
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ultimately deemed wrong); accord Hales, 842 P.2d at 895 (reversing negligence penalty 
because of good faith argument based on understandable confusion, despite ultimately 
rejecting petitioner's arguments and affirming Tax Commission on the merits). 
The Tax Commission affirmed the penalty because it f'note[d] that several years ago, 
Vermax of Florida was assessed a sales tax deficiency for the same type of deficiency as is 
involved here." The Tax Commission claims that it notified Vermax of Florida of the 
previous deficiency. Vermax of Florida denies that it received any such notice, and the 
record is devoid of evidence that Vermax of Florida was ever notified. Most importantly, 
Vermax of Florida did not exist "several years ago" in relation to the audit period. A 
separate entity by the name of Vermax Corporation existed, with which Vermax of Florida 
has no unity of ownership. Moreover, Vermax of Florida actively sought and adhered to 
advice from its auditors and certified public accountants, (R. 0142, 0151, 0183-0184), which 
behavior has been deemed reasonable by the United States Supreme Court. United States v. 
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985). Because Vermax of Florida's behavior was 
reasonable, it could not have acted negligently, as section 59-l-401(3)(a) requires for a 
penalty to be properly assessed. In addition, as this lengthy brief amply demonstrates, 
Vermax of Florida has set forth several colorable arguments supported by controlling 
decisions of this Court. The existence of a bona fide, good faith dispute negates the 
imposition of a negligence penalty. Hales, 842 P.2d at 895. 
In marshalling the evidence, Vermax of Florida maintains that the only record 
evidence that could support the Tax Commission's ruling is a Tax Commission Decision 
entered on July 11, 1986 against Vermax Corporation. (R.0130). Vermax Corporation, a 
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Utah corporation, is a different entity from Petitioner here, a Florida corporation. (Formal 
Hearing Transcript, at Page 16, Lines 13 through 21). Vermax of Florida, is a distinct 
corporate entity, and Vermax Corporation's prior negligence should not be attributed to 
Vermax of Florida. 
It would be unfair to penalize Vermax of Florida for the negligence of another, and it 
would go against the substantial evidence in the record demonstrating Vermax of Florida's 
lack of negligence. Furthermore, the Tax Commission's ruling completely ignores Vermax 
of Florida's good faith interpretation of several points of law, which, under this Court's prior 
decisions, negates a finding of negligence. See Hales, 842 P.2d at 895. For these reasons, 
the penalty should be reversed in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Vermax of Florida respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Commission's assessment of additional sales tax and negligence penalty. 
al 
DATED this _2l£vday of February, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Mark O. Morris, Esq. 
Amy E. Weissman, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Attorneys for Vermax of Florida, Inc. 
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59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph 
corporations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately 
owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished for 
commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished for 
residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) (i) admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums, 
planetariums, shows of any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts, 
carnivals, amusement parks, amusement rides, circuses, menageries, 
fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dances, boxing and wrestling 
matches, closed circuit television broadcasts, billiard or pool parlors, 
bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving ranges, batting 
cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile trails, 
tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides, river runs, jeep tours, 
boat tours, scenic cruises, horseback rides, sports activities, or any 
other amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or 
athletic activity; 
(ii) the tax imposed on admission or usei fees in Subsection (i) does 
not affect an entity's sales tax exempt status under Section 59-12-
1041 ; 
(g) (i) use of amusement devices, including music machines, pinball 
machines, and mechanical or electronic games, provided that the 
owner or lessee of these devices is required to remit only 75% of the 
sales tax liability imposed under this chapter; 
(ii) by October 1, 1995, and every five years thereafter, the Tax 
Review Commission and the Revenue and Taxation Interim Commit-
tee shall review the 25% exclusion from remittance and determine 
whether the exclusion from remittance should be continued, modified, 
or repealed; 
(h) (i) use of coin-operated car washes, provided that the owner or 
lessee of these devices is required to remit only 75% of the sales tax 
liability imposed under this chapter; 
(ii) by October 1, 1995, and every five years thereafter, the Tax 
Review Commission and the Revenue and Taxation Interim Commit-
tee shall review the 25% exclusion from remittance and determine 
whether the exclusion from remittance should be continued, modified, 
or repealed; 
(i) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(j) (i) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property, except that the 
owner or lessee of coin-operated laundry machines or coin-operated 
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dry cleaning machines is required to remit only 75% of the sales tax 
liability imposed under this chapter; 
(ii) by October 1, 1995, and every five years thereafter, the Tax 
Review Commission and the Revenue and Taxation Interim Commit-
tee shall review the 25% exclusion from remittance and determine 
whether the exclusion from remittance should be continued, modified, 
or repealed; 
(k) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and 
services for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(1) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(m) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property 
situs is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the 
property is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(n) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 5% through June 30, 1994; and 
(b) 4.875% from and after July 1, 1994. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection f l)(d) shall be 2% from and 
after January 1, 1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be 
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by 
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah 
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a Ve4% tax rate on 
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a Ve4% tax rate under 
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection 
(1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 
(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt 
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any 
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds issued 
by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in Section 
9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, 
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not 
including protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
(5) From July 1, 1996, through June 30, 2003, the annual amount of sales 
and use tax generated by a Va% tax rate on the taxable items and services 
under Subsection (1) shall be used for water projects as provided in this 
subsection. 
(a) Fifty percent of the amount generated by the Vs% tax rate shall be 
transferred to the Water Resource Conservation and Development Fund 
created in Section 73-10-24 for use by the Division of Water Resources. In 
addition to the uses allowed of the fund under Section 73-10-24, the fund 
may also be used to: 
(i) develop the wrater of the Bear River; 
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(ii) provide a portion of the local cost share, not to exceed 50% of the 
funds made available to the Division of Water Resources under this 
section, of potential project features of the Central Utah Project; 
(iii) fund state required dam safety and improvements; and 
(iv) protect the state's interest in the interstate water compact 
allocations, including the hiring of technical and legal staff. 
(b) Twenty-five percent of the amount generated by the Vs% tax rate 
shall be transferred to the Water Quality Security Subaccount created in 
Section 73-10c-5 for use by the Water Quality Board to fund wastewater 
projects as defined in Section 73-10b-2. 
(c) Twenty-five percent of the amount generated by the Va% tax rate 
shall be transferred to the Drinking Water Security Subaccount created in 
Section 73-10c-5 for use by the Division of Drinking Water to: 
(i) provide for the installation and repair of collection, treatment, 
storage, and distribution facilities for any public water system, as 
defined in Section 19-4-102; 
(ii) develop underground sources of water, including springs and 
wells; and 
(iii) develop surface water sources. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsections (a), (b), and (c), $100,000 of the 
amount generated by the Vs% tax rate each year shall be transferred as 
dedicated credits to the Division of Water Rights to cover the costs 
incurred in hiring legal and other technical staff for the adjudication of 
water rights. Any remaining balance at the end of each fiscal year shall 
lapse back to the contributing funds on a prorated basis. 
(6) If the Legislature does not enact any increase in the rate of the motor 
fuel tax as provided in Title 59, Chapter 13: 
(a) If in fiscal year 1995-96, General Fund revenues are at least $200 
million in excess of the General Fund revenues in fiscal year 1994-95, 
beginning on July 1, 1996 through June 30, 2003, the annual amount of 
sales and use tax generated by a Ys% tax rate on the taxable items and 
services under Subsection (1) shall be transferred to the Transportation 
Fund and shall be used for transportation projects. 
(b) If the General Fund revenues in fiscal year 1995-96 do not require 
the Vs% transfer under Subsection (a), then in fiscal year 1997-98, 
1999-2000, and 2001-2002, the Vs% transfer otherwise provided for in 
Subsection (5) shall be made to the Transportation Fund. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L* 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41, 
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1; 
1992, ch. 241, § 370; 1994, ch. 210, § 2; 1994, 
ch. 217, § 1; 1994, ch. 290, § 1; 1994, ch. 318, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 210, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote 
Subsection (l)(f), which read "admission to any 
place of amusement, entertainment, or recre-
ation, including seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise, and other similar accommodations.'' 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 217, effective 
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (l)(g), (l)(h), 
and (lXjXii); added the language beginning 
"except that the owner" at the end of Subsection 
(lXjXi); deleted former Subsection (2)(a), which 
read "5 %2% through December 31, 1989"; 
deleted former Subsection (3)(a), which read "2 
%2% through December 31, 1989"; and made 
related stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 290, effective 
July 1, 1994, rewrote Subsection (2)(a), which 
read a5 3/32% through December 31, 1989"; 
rewrote Subsection (2Kb), which read 5% from 
and after January 1, 1990"; deleted former 
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Subsection (3)(a), which read "2 3/32% through 
December 31, 1989" and redesignated former 
Subsection (3)(b) as Subsection (3). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 318, effective 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Cementing. 
Direct sale vs. lease. 
Exemption from tax. 
Installation. 
—Responsibility. 
Oil and gas well stimulation services. 
Purchaser. 
Repairs and renovations. 
Sale of goods to subsidiary. 
Transfer of vehicles. 
Transportation costs as part of sales price. 
—"Small-batch" charges. 
Water softeners. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality, 
Although the state may include the price of 
services performed in connection with tangible 
property in calculating the basis for a use tax, it 
cannot impose a tax that discriminates against 
interstate commerce. In order for the state to 
include out-of-state services in the basis for 
calculating the use tax, the Constitution re-
quires that those services be taxable if per-
formed within the state. Union Pac. R.R. v. 
Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
The imposition of a use tax under this section 
on tangible personal property purchased out of 
state but stored or used in Utah did not create 
a discriminatory burden on interstate com-
merce contrary to the commerce clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, given that the state would 
have taxed the transaction at a similar rate 
under the sales tax provision if it had occurred 
within the state. Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing 
Div., 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
Cementing. 
A company selling cementing services involv-
ing the mixing, delivery, and injection of con-
crete slurry into well holes is not a real prop-
erty contractor; because the essence of the 
transaction between the company and its well 
operator customers is tangible personal prop-
erty, the company purchased materials for re-
sale to the well operator as the ultimate con-
sumer. B.J.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992). 
Direct sale vs. lease. 
The tax commission's decision to tax post-
lease sales of water softeners as tangible per-
sonal property while exempting direct sales of 
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (5) and (6). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
the same product as an improvement to real 
property was unreasonable. The nature of the 
product as an improvement to real estate did 
not change simply because it was sold after 
initial installation under a lease. Superior Soft 
Water Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 843 P.2d 
525 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Exemption from tax. 
Amusement arcade's fees collected for use of 
its batting cages, roller skating rink, and laser 
tag game were not subject to a sales tax under 
this section since the fees were not obtained as 
admissions for the "right to enter a place," but 
were merely monies charged to do particular 
things. 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 223 
Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Contractor was not liable for sales tax for 
materials purchased by and used on behalf of a 
school district because the purchaser within 
the meaning of Subsection (l)(n) was the school 
district. Since the school district was exempt 
from sales taxes as a subdivision or institution 
of the state, the fact that the school district had 
a nonexempt party incorporate the purchased 
property. into its realty did not change the 
character of the transaction. Brown Plumbing 
& Heating Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 224 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (1993). 
When one of the express exemptions in § 59-
12-104 applies, the sales tax is inapplicable, 
and there is no policy reason for assessing the 
use tax. Knowledge Data Sys. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Installation. 
—Responsibility. 
Even though a joint venture agreement may 
have allocated responsibility for installation to 
petitioner's co-venturer, petitioner who had ul-
timate responsibility to ensure installation was 
a real property contractor and therefore liable 
for the taxes assessed. Niederhauser Ornamen-
tal & Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Oil and gas well stimulation services. 
Cementing services involving the mixing, de-
livery, and injection of concrete slurry into well 
holes were subject to sales and use taxes; how-
ever, hydraulic fracturing and acidizing ser-
vices which involved the injection of chemicals 
into the well to stimulate well flow did not 
produce a finished tangible product subject to 
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taxes. B.J.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992). 
Purchaser . 
The focus of Subsection (l)(a) is on the pur-
chaser, rather than the item purchased. Thorup 
Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
A contractor is not liable for sales taxes on 
property that it did not purchase or own. 
Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(1993). 
Electrical contractor could not be assessed a 
use tax on materials purchased by owners that 
were tax-exempt entities. Arco Elec. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 222 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(1993), following Thorup Brothers Constr., Inc. 
v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
Repairs and renovations. 
The tax commission erred when it included 
the cost of milling and drilling raw logs in-
curred by a railroad in assessing a use tax on 
railroad ties brought instate for use. The basis 
for calculating the use tax in such a case is the 
amount paid for the raw logs when purchased 
plus the amount paid for services that fall into 
one of the specified categories of taxable ser-
vices set forth in this section. The commission 
erroneously concluded that the milling and 
drilling procedures were "repairs or renova-
tions" within the meaning of Subsection (Dig). 
Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 876 
(Utah 1992). 
Sale of goods to subsidiary. 
A seller was liable under Subsection (l)(a) for 
sales of goods to another corporation despite 
the fact that the Department of Transportation 
found the two corporations to be a single entity 
for the purposes of the Davis Bacon Act. One 
59-12-104- Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to a Utah 
state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax 
Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions, 
except sales of construction materials however, construction materials 
purchased by the state, its institutions, or its political subdivisions which 
are installed or converted to real property by employees of the state, its 
institutions, or its political subdivisions are exempt; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 150% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed; 
agency's determination is not necessarily bint 
ing on the deliberations of another agency, an 
federal labor law criteria are irrelevant to 
determination of state taxability. Hales Sand I 
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 887 (Uta 
1992). 
Transfer of vehicles. 
Transfer of vehicles subject to sales tax. Se 
B. J.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2< 
822 (Utah 1992). 
Transportation costs as part of sales price 
Transportation charges are taxable unde: 
Subsection (l)(a) as part of the sales price o 
personal property if they are incurred before 
the transfer of title. When a sales contract 
requires delivery at destination, title passes at 
destination and the transportation costs are 
therefore subject to taxation unless the parties 
explicitly agree otherwise. Hales Sand & 
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 887 (Utah 
1992). 
—"Small-batch" charges, 
"Small-batch" charges added by a concrete 
seller to concrete batches that were too small to 
absorb the costs of delivery were taxable under 
Subsection (l)(a) as a transportation charge 
added to the sales price. Hales Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
Water softeners. 
The sale of water softeners, sold pursuant to 
sales and installation contracts, are sales of 
improvements to real estate, and not sales of 
tangible personal property subject to sales tax. 
Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 843 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing 
Div., 231 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
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(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or known risks, which resulted 
in the failure to collect, account for, or pay over the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate or to correct mismanagement, having 
notice that the tax was not or is not being collected, accounted for, or 
paid over as provided by law. 
(c) The commission or court need not find a bad motive or specific intent 
to defraud the government or deprive it of revenue to establish willfulness 
under this section. 
(d) If the commission determines that a person is liable for the penalty 
under Subsection (2), the commission shall assess the penalty and give 
notice and demand for payment. The notice and demand for payment shall 
be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the person's last-known 
address. 
History: C. 1953, 59-1-302, enacted by L. tuted "Subsections (4) and (5)" for "Subsection 
1988, ch. 3, § 89; 1992, ch. 249, § 1; 1993, ch. (4)n in Subsection (7), and made stylistic 
2, § 1; 1994, ch. 107, § 1. changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "and use" deleted former Subsections (2) and (3), relating 
in Subsection (l)(a), inserted "clean fuel" and to the creation of a lien for unpaid taxes; added 
"Parts 2, 3, and 4" in Subsection (l)(f), deleted Subsection (7)(d); and made related stylistic 
former Subsection (l)(h), which read "corporate changes, 
franchise tax under Chapter 7, Part 1" substi-
59-1-302.1. Lien for taxes. 
(1) If any person liable to pay any tax provided in Title 59, except a tax 
imposed under Chapter 2, 3, or 4, neglects or refuses to pay that tax after 
demand, the amount, including any interest, additional amount, additional 
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue, is a lien in 
favor of the state upon all property and rights to property, whether real or 
personal, belonging to that person. 
(2) Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by this 
section for unpaid taxes arises at the time the assessment is made and 
continues until the liability for the assessed amount, or a judgment against the 
taxpayer arising from that liability, is satisfied or becomes unenforceable 
because of lapse of time. 
History: C. 1953,59-1-302.1, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 107, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 107 
PART 4 
PENALTIES, INTEREST AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
INFORMATION 
59-1-401. Penalties. 
(1) (a) The penalty for failure to file a tax return within the time prescribed 
by law including extensions is the greater of $20 or 10% of the unpaid tax 
due on the return, 
(b) Subsection (1) does not apply to amended returns. 
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(2) The penalty for failure to pay tax due shall be the greater of $20 or 10% 
of the unpaid tax for: 
(a) failure to pay any tax, as reported on a timely filed return; 
(b) failure to pay any tax within 90 days of the due date of the return, 
if there was a late filed return subject to the penalty provided under 
Subsection (l)(a); 
(c) failure to pay any tax within 30 days of the date of mailing any notice 
of deficiency of tax unless a petition for redetermination or a request for 
agency action is filed within 30 days of the date of mailing the notice of 
deficiency; 
(d) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date the commission's 
order constituting final agency action resulting from a timely filed petition 
for redetermination or request for agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b), unless a petition for 
judicial review is timely filed; and 
(e) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date of a final judicial 
decision resulting from a timely filed petition for judicial review. 
(3) (a) Beginning January 1, 1995, in the case of any underpayment of 
estimated tax or quarterly installments required by Section 59-5-107, 
59-5-207, and 59-7-504, there shall be added a penalty in an amount 
determined by applying the interest rate provided under Section 59-1-402 
plus four percentage points to the amount of the underpayment for the 
period of the underpayment. 
(b) (i) For purposes of Subsection (3)(a), the amount of the underpay-
ment shall be the excess of the required installment over the amount, 
if any, of the installment paid on or before the due date for the 
installment. 
(ii) The period of the underpayment shall run from the due date for 
the installment to whichever of the following dates is the earlier: 
(A) the original due date of the tax return, without extensions, 
for the taxable year; or 
(B) with respect to any portion of the underpayment, the date 
on which that portion is paid. 
(hi) For purposes of this Subsection (3), a payment of estimated tax 
shall be credited against unpaid required installments in the order in 
which the installments are required to be paid. 
(4) (a) In case of an extension of time to file an individual income tax or 
corporate franchise tax return, if the lesser of 90% of the total tax reported 
on the tax return or 100% of the prior year's tax is not paid by the due date 
of the return, not including extensions, a 2% per month penalty shall apply 
on the unpaid tax during the period of extension. 
(b) If a return is not filed within the extension time period as provided 
in Section 59-7-505 or 59-10-516, penalties as provided in Subsection (1) 
and Subsection (2)(b) shall be added in lieu of the penalty assessed under 
this subsection as if no extension of time for filing a return had been 
granted. 
(5) (a) Additional penalties for underpayments of tax are as follows: 
(i) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence, the penalty is 
10% of the underpayment. 
(ii) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional disregard of 
law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the underpayment. 
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(hi) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 
per period or 50% of the tax due. 
(iv) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to evade the 
tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per period or 100% of the 
underpayment. 
(b) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a penalty 
imposed under Subsection (ii), (hi), or (iv), the commission shall notify the 
taxpayer of the proposed penalty. 
(i) The notice of proposed penalty shall: 
(A) set forth the basis of the assessment; and 
(B) be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the 
person's last-known address. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the notice of proposed penalty, the person 
against whom the penalty is proposed may: 
(A) pay the amount of the proposed penalty at the place and 
time stated in the notice; or 
(B) proceed in accordance with the review procedures of Sub-
section (iii). 
(hi) Any person against whom a penalty has been proposed in 
accordance with this subsection may contest the proposed penalty by 
filing a petition for an adjudicative proceeding with the commission. 
(iv) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a 
penalty under this subsection, the commission shall assess the 
penalty and give notice and demand for payment. The notice and 
demand for payment shall be mailed by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, to the person's last-known address. 
(6) The penalty for failure to file an information return or a complete 
supporting schedule is $50 for each return or schedule up to a maximum of 
$1,000. 
(7) If any taxpayer, in furtherance of a frivolous position, has a prima facie 
intent to delay or impede administration of the tax law and files a purported 
return that fails to contain information from which the correctness of reported 
tax liability can be determined or that clearly indicates that the tax liability 
shown must be substantially incorrect, the penalty is $500. 
(8) For monthly payment of sales and use taxes under Section 59-12-108, in 
addition to any other penalties for late payment, a vendor may not retain a 
percentage of sales and use taxes collected as otherwise allowable under 
Section 59-12-108. 
(9) As provided in Section 76-8-1101, the following are criminal penalties: 
(a) Any person who is required by this title or any laws the commission 
administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from 
the commission, or who operates without having registered or secured a 
license or permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit 
is expired or not current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $500 nor more 
than $1,000. 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of this 
title or any lawful requirement of the commission, fails to make, render, 
sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the time 
required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
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fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty 
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
(d) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this 
section is six years from the date the tax should have been remitted. 
(10) Upon making a record of its actions, and upon reasonable cause shown, 
the commission may waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or 
interest imposed under this part. 
History: C. 1953, 59-1-401, enacted by L* 
1987, ch. 3, § 6; 1987, ch. 148, § 1; 1988, ch. 
193, § 1; 1988, ch. 213, § 3; 1989, ch. 22, § 37; 
1991, ch. 37, § 1; 1992, ch. 298, § 1; 1994, ch. 
93, § 2; 1994, ch. 107, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 107, effective May 2, 1994, in 
Subsection (3) (which is Subsection (5) in the 
reconciled version), designated the existing 
provision as Subsection (a), added Subsection 
(b), and made related stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 93, effective July 
1,1994, rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), adding 
Subsections (2)(b), (2)(d), and (2)(e) and rewrit-
ing the provisions of former Subsection (2)0)) as 
Subsection (4)(a); added Subsections (3) and 
(4)(b); renumbered former Subsections (3) to (8) 
as Subsections (5) to (10); rewrote the introduc-
tory language of Subsection (5); and substi-
tuted "a vendor may not retain a percentage of 
sales and use taxes collected as otherwise al-
lowable under" for "there is a penalty of 10% of 
the amount of any tax not paid and the loss of 
any reimbursement for sales tax collection 
costs provided for in" in Subsection (8). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Intentional disregard. 
—Not found. 
Negligent underpayment. 
—Good faith. 
Intentional disregard. 
—Not found. 
Although an Illinois corporation did not com-
ply with the State Tax Commission's written 
demand for sales taxes, that disregard did not 
constitute an "intentional disregard of law or 
rule" since when the commission's letter was 
sent, the corporation's status as a real property 
contractor, subjecting it to the tax, was argu-
able. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (1992). 
Negligent underpayment. 
—Good faith, 
A seller of concrete found liable for a sales tax 
deficiency was not subject to the negligence 
penalty under this section, since it based its 
nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith 
interpretation of an arguable point of law. 
Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 
P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
59-1-402. Interest. 
(1) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), the rate of interest applicable 
to certain installment sales for the purposes of the corporate franchise tax 
shall be determined pursuant to Section 453A, Internal Revenue Code, as 
provided in Section 59-7-132. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided for by law, the interest rate for a calendar 
year for all taxes and fees administered by the commission shall be calculated 
based on the federal short-term rate determined by the Secretary of the 
Treasury under Section 6621, Internal Revenue Code, and in effect for the 
preceding fourth calendar quarter. 
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taxes. B.J.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992). 
Purchaser . 
The focus of Subsection (l)(a) is on the pur-
chaser, rather than the item purchased. Thorup 
Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
A contractor is not liable for sales taxes on 
property that it did not purchase or own. 
Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(1993). 
Electrical contractor could not be assessed a 
use tax on materials purchased by owners that 
were tax-exempt entities. Arco Elec. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 222 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(1993), following Thorup Brothers Constr., Inc. 
v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
Repairs and renovations. 
The tax commission erred when it included 
the cost of milling and drilling raw logs in-
curred by a railroad in assessing a use tax on 
railroad ties brought instate for use. The basis 
for calculating the use tax in such a case is the 
amount paid for the raw logs when purchased 
plus the amount paid for services that fall into 
one of the specified categories of taxable ser-
vices set forth in this section. The commission 
erroneously concluded that the milling and 
drilling procedures were "repairs or renova-
tions" within the meaning of Subsection (l)(g). 
Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 876 
(Utah 1992). 
Sale of goods to subsidiary. 
A seller was liable under Subsection (l)(a) for 
sales of goods to another corporation despite 
the fact that the Department of Transportation 
found the two corporations to be a single entity 
for the purposes of the Davis Bacon Act. One 
agency's determination is not necessarily bind-
ing on the deliberations of another agency, and 
federal labor law criteria are irrelevant to a 
determination of state taxability. Hales Sand & 
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 
1992). 
Transfer of vehicles. 
Transfer of vehicles subject to sales tax. See 
B.J.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P2d 
822 (Utah 1992). 
Transportation costs as part of sales price. 
Transportation charges are taxable under 
Subsection (IXa) as part of the sales price of 
personal property if they are incurred before 
the transfer of title. When a sales contract 
requires delivery at destination, title passes at 
destination and the transportation costs are 
therefore subject to taxation unless the parties 
explicitly agree otherwise. Hales Sand & 
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 887 (Utah 
1992). 
—"Small-batch" charges. 
"Small-batch" charges added by a concrete 
seller to concrete batches that were too small to 
absorb the costs of delivery were taxable under 
Subsection (IXa) as a transportation charge 
added to the sales price. Hales Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
Water softeners. 
The sale of water softeners, sold pursuant to 
sales and installation contracts, are sales of 
improvements to real estate, and not sales of 
tangible personal property subject to sales tax. 
Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 843 P2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing 
Div., 231 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to a Utah 
state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax 
Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions, 
except sales of construction materials however, construction materials 
purchased by the state, its institutions, or its political subdivisions which 
are installed or converted to real property by employees of the state, its 
institutions, or its political subdivisions are exempt; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 150% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed; 
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(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and 
related services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by 
common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio pro-
gram tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, 
distributor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commer-
cial television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines that are: 
(a) located in multiple dwelling units; 
(b) used exclusively for the benefit of tenants; and 
(c) not available for use by the general public; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the conduct 
of their regular reUgious or charitable functions and activities, if the 
requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor 
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as 
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the construc-
tion of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sections 
19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of 
this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher 
education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or 
registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and 
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah; 
(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment described in 
SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, of the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget; 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment"; 
(c) by October 1, 1991, and every five years thereafter, the commis-
sion shall review this exemption and make recommendations to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning whether the 
exemption should be continued, modified, or repealed. In its report to 
the Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax commission 
review shall include at least: 
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(i) the cost of the exemption; 
(ii) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(iii) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special test 
equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States govern-
ment or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms 
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is vested 
in the United States government as evidenced by a government identifi-
cation tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight by common carriers; 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or 
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculating 
sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are 
limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then existing 
fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being traded in, 
as determined by the commission; 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds 
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products; 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily and 
directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equipment and 
supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or not they 
become part of real estate and whether or not installed by farmer, 
contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales- of: 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a man-
ner that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit 
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies;' 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and 
supplies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or 
in transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put; 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other 
agricultural produce if sold by the producer; 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps; 
(24) sales of nonreturnable containers, nonreturnable labels, nonre-
turnable bags, nonreturnable shipping cases, and nonreturnable casings 
to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer for use in packaging 
tangible personal property to be sold by that manufacturer, processor, 
wholesaler, or retailer; 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own 
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property pur-
chased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the 
time of purchase; 
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(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured or compounded product; 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part 
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax 
imposed by this part and Part 2; 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c), 
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections; 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture; 
(31) sales or leases made before June 30, 1996, of rolls, rollers, refrac-
tory brick, electric motors, and other replacement parts used in the 
furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in SIC Code 3312 of the 
1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget; 
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which 
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter 
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state; 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state that 
is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant to 
contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes 
a sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes 
imposed by this chapter; 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use 
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is 
passed in Utah; 
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service 
for purposes of providing telephone service; and 
(36) fares charged to persons transported directly by a public transit 
district created under the authority of Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 6; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 
80-15-6; 1945, ch. 110, § 1; 1957, ch. 126, § 1; 
1957, ch. 127, § 1; 1965, ch. 128, § 1; 1967, 
ch. 162, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, § 3; 1969 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 14, § 3; 1973, ch. 42, § 9; 1973, ch. 
154, § 1; 1975, ch. 179, § 2; 1976, ch. 28, § 1; 
1979, ch. 195, § 1; 1981, ch. 238, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 239, § 2; 1982, ch. 70, § 1; 1983, ch. 264, 
§ 1; 1983, ch. 281, § 1; 1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 6, 
§ 2; 1984, ch. 59, § 1; 1984, ch. 60, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 80, § 3; 1986, ch. 9, § 1; 1986, ch. 55, § 6; 
1986, ch. 99, § 1; 1986, ch. 134, § 1; 1986, ch. 
168, § 1; C. 1953, 59-15-6; renumbered by L. 
1987, ch. 5, § 26; 1987, ch. 51, § 1; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, §§ 1, 2; 1988, ch. 58, § 1; 1988, 
ch.66,§ 2; 1988, ch. 69, § 1; 1989, ch. 89, § 1; 
1989, ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 247, § 1; 1990, 
ch.22,§ 2; 1990, ch. 36, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 57; 
1991, ch. I l l , § 1; 1991, ch. 112, § 216; 1992, 
ch. 66, § 3; 1992, ch. 298, § 2; 1993, ch. 166, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 296, § 1; 1994, ch. 49, § 1;1994, 
ch.155, § 1; 1994, ch. 213, § 1; 1994, ch. 217, 
§ 2; 1994, ch. 226, § 2; 1994, ch. 248, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment by ch. 166, effective May 3, 1993, substi-
tuted "sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and 
special fuel" for "sales of motor fuels and special 
fuels" in Subsection (1). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 296, effective 
May 3, 1993, substituted "1996" for "1994" in 
Subsection (31). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 49, effective May 
2, 1994, rewrote Subsection (24), which for-
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merly read: "any container, label, shipping 
case, or, in the case of meat or meat products, 
any casing." 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
May 2, 1994, in Subsection (31), deleted "after 
July 1, 1987, and" after "leases made* and "but 
only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah 
facility purchased and reopened for the produc-
tion of steel" at the end. 
The 1994 amendment bv ch. 155, effective 
July 1, 1994, substituted "150%* for "120%" in 
Subsection (3). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 213, effective 
July 1, 1994, redesignated the subsections un-
der Subsection (15); substituted "by common 
carriers" for "and express or street railway 
fares" in Subsection (17); and added Subsection 
ANALYSIS 
Charitable institution. 
—Activities. 
—Purchase by subcontractor. 
"Consumption." 
Intrastate movement of freight. 
Isolated or occasional sale. 
"Manufacturer." 
Medicine. 
New or expanding operations. 
Real property. 
Registered vehicle. 
—Sale to nonresident. 
Sale in sister state. 
Sale to state. 
Sprays to control disease. 
Cited. 
Char i table institution. 
—Activities. 
Church industry auxiliary, chartered as a 
non-profit corporation, which ran, among other 
things, a transient shelter, a vocational educa-
tion program, a retirement center, and a day 
care center, charging nominal fees to defray 
costs, lost its sales-tax-exempt status by sever-
ing from its religious institution, since the 
auxiliary's remaining common membership 
and weekly spiritual practices did not convert 
the auxiliary from a business organization into 
a religious institution. SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 
R2d 1167 (Utah 1993). 
—Purchase by subcontractor. 
The fact that the amount of the tax might be 
passed along to the general contractor and then 
on to the church owning the buildings in which 
the general contrator was installing products 
did not bring a subcontractor's purchase of 
materials used in making the products under 
(36), making a related stylistic change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 217, effective 
July 1, 1994, deleted "coin-operated dry clean-
ing machines, or coin-operated car washes" in 
the introductory language of Subsection (7); 
added Subsections (7)(a) through (7)(c); subdi-
vided Subsection (15); and made related stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 226, effective 
July 1, 1994, inserted the language following 
the first occurrence of "political subdivisions" in 
Subsection (2) and deleted "and, after July 1, 
1993" after "activities" in Subsection (8). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Subsection (8). Niederhauser Ornamental & 
Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 43 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"Consumption." 
Steel manufacturers who lance pipes, stir-
ring lances, and mill rolls primarily for their 
use as equipment and only incidentally for 
their use as ingredients in the manufacturing 
process are liable for sales and use taxes on the 
items. Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992). 
Intrastate movement of freight. 
Subsection (17), providing for a sales tax 
exemption for intrastate movements of freight, 
is limited to common carriers and does not 
provide an exemption for intrastate delivery 
made by the seller in its own trucks. Hales 
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 R2d 
887 (Utah 1992). 
Isolated or occasional sale. 
The "isolated or occasional sales" exemption 
applied to the trade-in of used computer equip-
ment by a customer to a retailer of computer 
systems and thus the retailer's own use of the 
equipment was exempt from the use tax. 
Knowledge Data Sys. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
"Manufacturer." 
Subsection (15) does not authorize the State 
Tax Commission to define the term "manufac-
turer" to restrict the manufacturing sales tax 
exemption set forth therein; a rule of the Com-
mission limiting the availability of the exemp-
tion was invalid. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 R2d 
1304 (Utah 1993). 
Medicine. 
Sales tax on sales of oxygen concentrators to 
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medically dependent individuals was erroneous 
because oxygen concentrators fall under "any 
oxygen ... prescribed by a physician" in § 59-
12-102(4)(a)(iii). Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
New or expanding operations. 
The commission erroneously interpreted SIC 
Code 3652, incorporated by reference in Sub-
section (15), when it determined that activities 
of video tape producer in expanding its manu-
facturing capacities did not fall within the 
scope of the federal definition. Bonneville Int'l 
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 52 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Real property. 
Where, under its sales contracts, an Illinois 
corporation fabricated, erected, and installed 
on its customers' real property large tanks that 
were not readily removable, and it was not 
intended that they be moveable or removed, 
then the installed tanks, once attached, were 
real property and the corporation was a real 
property contractor, not a manufacturer, and 
was not eligible for the exemption for materials 
used in manufacturing. Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (1992). 
Where an Illinois corporation's customers in-
tended to purchase fully assembled tanks per-
manently installed on real estate, whether that 
real estate was located in Utah or another state 
was not relevant as to the corporation's status 
as a real property contractor. Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 R2d 303 
(1992). 
Registered vehicle. 
—Sale to nonresident. 
While taxpayer's legal residence created a 
legitimate source of dispute, because he main-
tained a registered vehicle with Utah desig-
nated as home state and allowed a vehicle to be 
kept or used by a Utah resident, the State Tax 
Commission reasonably found that the tax-
payer had resident status for sales tax purposes 
and thus was disqualified from claiming the 
nonresident exemption. Putvin v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 837 R2d 589 (Utah Ct. App 
1992). 
Sale in s is ter state. 
Taxes that come due first take priority over 
taxes paid first. Therefore, petitioner was liable 
for the Utah tax first because the sales to 
petitioner in Utah of materials used in making 
the finished products occurred long before peti-
tioner sold finished products in Nevada. 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Wrorks Co. 
v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App' 
1993). 
Sale to s ta te . 
Payment for goods by a state warrant does 
not alone make it a sale to the state or its 
institutions or political subdivisions to exempt 
it from sales tax. Rocky Mt. Energy v. Utah Tax 
Comm'n, 852 R2d 284 (Utah 1993). 
Contractor was not liable for sales tax for 
materials purchased by and used on behalf of a 
school district because the purchaser within 
the meaning of § 59-12-103(1X1) was the school 
district. Since the school district was exempt 
from sales taxes as a subdivision or institution 
of the state, the fact that the school district had 
a nonexempt party incorporate the purchased 
property into its realty did not change the 
character of the transaction. Brown Plumbing 
& Heating Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 224 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (1993). 
Sprays to control disease. 
Spraying liquid nitrogen on meat patties to 
prevent microorganisms that cause disease fits 
within the plain meaning of Subsection (20), 
and reference to other rules of statutory con-
struction to determine the proper meaning of 
this subsection is unnecessary. OSI Indus., Inc. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 
34 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (1993). 
59-12-104.1. Exemptions for religious or chari table insti-
tut ions. 
(1) Sales made by religious or charitable institutions or organizations are 
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is made 
in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious or 
charitable functions or activities. 
(2) (a) Sales made to a religious or charitable institution or organization are 
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is 
made in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious 
or charitable functions and activities. 
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a deficiency assessment shall be made and written 
notification shall be given to the taxpayer. 
R865-19-20S. Basis for Repor t ing Tax P u r s u a n t 
to Utah Code Ann. Sect ion 59-12-107. 
A. Amounts shown on returns must include the 
total sales made during the period of such returns, 
and the tax must be reported and paid upon such 
basis. Total sales means the total amount of all cash, 
credit, installment, and conditional sales made dur-
ing the period covered by the return. 
B. Justified adjustments may be made and credit 
allowed for cash discounts, returned goods, bad debts, 
and repossessions which result from sales upon which 
the tax has been reported and paid in full by the 
retailers to the Tax Commission. 
1. Such adjustments and credits will be allowed 
only if the retailer has not reimbursed himself in the 
full amount of the tax except as noted in B.6.a. and 
can establish such facts by records, receipts or other 
means. 
2. In no case shall the credit be greater than the 
sales tax on that portion of the purchase price re-
maining unpaid at the time the goods are returned, 
the account is charged off, or the repossession occurs. 
3. Any refund or credit given to the purchaser must 
include the related sales tax. 
4. Sales tax credits for bad debts are allowable only 
on accounts determined to be worthless and actually 
charged off for income tax purposes. Recoveries made 
on bad debts and repossessions for which credit has 
been claimed must be reported and the tax paid. 
5. Sales tax credit for repossessions is allowable on 
the basis of the original amount subject to tax, less 
down payment. This amount is multiplied by the ra-
tio of the number of monthly payments not made, 
divided by the total number of monthly payments re-
quired by the contract. 
a. For example: the credit allowed on a taxable 
$30,000 car sale with a $5,000 down payment fi-
nanced on a 60-month contract and repossessed after 
20 full payments were made would be $16,667 as 
computed and shown below. The number of unpaid 
full payments is determined by dividing the total re-
ceived on the contract by the monthly payment 
amount. 
TABLE 
Example: 
(1) Original amount subject to tax $30,000 
(2) Down payment or trade in (5,000) 
(3) Balance of taxable base financed 25,000 
(4) Number of full payments unpaid at 
the time of repossession 40 
(5) Total contract period (no. of months) 60 
Line 4 divided by line 5 times taxable base financed 
equals repossession credit 
40/60 x $25,000 = $16,667 
b. In cases where a contract assignment creates a 
partial (part of the loan amount) recourse obligation 
to the seller, any repossession credit must be calcu-
lated in the same manner as shown above. 
c. The credit for repossession shall be reported on 
the dealer's or vendor's sales tax return with an at-
tached schedule showing computations and appropri-
ate adjustments for any tax rate changes between the 
date of sale and the date of repossession. 
6. Credit for tax on repossessions is allowed only to 
the selling dealer or vendor. 
a. This does not preclude arrangements being made 
between the dealer or vendor and third party finan-
cial institutions wherein sales tax credits for repos-
sessions by financial institutions may be taken by the 
dealer or vendor who will in turn reimburse the fi-
nancial institution. 
b In the event the applicable vehicle dealer is no 
lonjer in business, and there are no outstanding de-
linquent taxes, the third party financial institution 
may apply directly to the Tax Commission for a re-
fund of the tax in the amount that would have been 
credited to the dealer. 
C. Adjustments in sales price, such as allowable dis-
counts or rebates cannot be anticipated. The tax must 
be based upon the original price unless such adjust-
ments were made prior to the close of the reporting 
period in which the tax upon the sale is due. If the 
price upon which the tax is computed and paid is 
subsequently adjusted, credit may be taken against 
the tax due on a subsequent return. 
D. If a sales tax rate change takes place prior to the 
reporting period when the credit is claimed, the tax 
credit must be determined and deducted rather than 
deducting the sales price adjustments. 
E. Commissions to agents are not deductible under 
any conditions for purposes of tax computation. 
RS65-19-22S. Sales and Use Tax Records Pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-111. 
A. Every retailer, lessor, lessee, and person doing 
business in this state or storing, using, or otherwise 
consuming in this state tangible personal property 
purchased from a retailer, shall keep and preserve 
complete and adequate records as may be necessary 
to determine the amount of sales and use tax for 
which'such person or entity is liable. Unless the Tax 
Commission authorizes in writing an alternative 
method of recordkeeping, these records shall: 
1. show gross receipts from sales, or rental pay-
ments from leases, of tangible personal property or 
services performed in connection writh tangible per-
sonal property made in this state, irrespective of 
whether the retailer regards the receipts to be tax-
able or nontaxable; 
2. show all deductions allowed by law and claimed 
in filing returns; 
3. show bills, invoices or similar evidence of all tan-
gible personal property purchased for sale, consump-
tion, or lease in this state; and 
4. include the normal books of account maintained 
by an ordinarily prudent business person engaged in 
such business, together with supporting documents of 
original entry such as: bills, receipts, invoices, and 
cash register tapes. All schedules or working papers 
used in connection with the preparation of tax re-
turns must also be maintained. 
B. Records may be microfilmed or microfiched. 
However, microfilm reproductions of general books of 
account — such as cash books, journals, voucher reg-
isters, ledgers, and like documents — are not accept-
able as original records. Where microfilm or micro-
fiche reproductions of supporting records are main-
tained — such as sales invoices, purchase invoices, 
credit memoranda and like documents — the follow-
ing conditions must be met: 
1. appropriate facilities must be provided for pres-
ervation of the films or fiche for the periods required 
and open to examination, 
2. microfilm rolls and microfiche must be systemat-
ically filed, indexed, cross referenced, and labeled to 
show beginning and ending numbers and to show be-
ginning and ending alphabetical listing of documents 
included, 
3 upon request of the Tax Commission, the tax-
payer shall provide transcriptions of any information 
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R865-19-27S. Retail Sales Defined P u r s u a n t to 
U t a h Code Ann. Sections 59-12-102(8)(a) and 
59-12-103(l)(g). 
A. The term retail sale has a broader meaning than 
the sale of tangible personal property. It includes any 
transfers, exchanges, or barter whether conditional 
or for a consideration by a person doing business in 
such commodity or service, either as a regularly orga-
nized principal endeavor or as an adjunct thereto. 
The price of the service or tangible personal property, 
the quantity sold, or the extent of the clientele are 
not factors which determine whether or not it is a 
retail sale. 
B. Retail sale also includes certain leases and 
rentals of tangible personal property as defined in 
Rule R865-19-32S, accommodations as defined in 
Rule R865-19-79S, services performed on tangible 
personal property as defined in Rules R865-19-51S 
and R865-19-78S, services that are part of a sale or 
repair, admissions as defined in Rules R865-19-33S 
and R865-19-34S, sales of meals as defined in Rules 
R865-19-61S and R865-19-62S, and sales of certain 
public utility services. 
C. A particular retail sale or portion of the selling 
price may not be subject to a sales or use tax. The 
status of the exemption is governed by the circum-
stances in each case. See other rules for specific and 
general exemption definitions, Rule R865-19-30S for 
definition of sales price and Rule RS65-19-72S cover-
ing trade-ins. 
R865-19-28S. Retai ler Defined Pur suan t to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-12-102. 
A. "Retailer" means vendors operating within this 
state directly, or indirectly through agents or repre-
sentatives, if the vendor: 
1. has or utilizes an office, distribution house, sales 
house, warehouse, service enterprise, or other place of 
business, 
2. maintains a stock of goods in Utah, 
3. regularly solicits orders whether or not such or-
ders are accepted in this state, unless the activity in 
this state consists solely of advertising or solicitation 
by direct mail, 
4. regularly engages in the delivery of property in 
this state other than by common carrier or United 
States mail, or 
5. regularly engages in any activity in connection 
with the leasing or servicing of property located 
within this state. 
B. A person may be a retailer within the meaning 
of the act even though the sale of tangible personal 
property is incidental to his general business. For ex-
ample, a contractor may operate a salvage business 
and be a retailer within the meaning of the act. 
R865-19-29S. Wholesale Sale Defined P u r s u a n t 
to U t a h Code Ann. Section 59-12-102. 
A. "Wholesale sale" means any sale by a whole-
saler, retailer, or any other person, of tangible per-
sonal property or services to a retailer, jobber, dealer, 
or another wholesaler for resale. 
1. All sales of tangible personal property or services 
which enter into and become an integral or compo-
nent part of tangible personal property or product 
which is further manufactured or compounded for 
sale, or the container or the shipping case thereof, are 
wholesale sales. 
2. All sales of poultry, dairy, or other livestock feed 
and the components thereof and all seeds and seed-
lings are deemed to be wholesale sales where the 
eggs, milk, meat, or other livestock products, plants, 
or plant products are produced for resale. 
3. Sprays and insecticides used in the control of 
insect pests, diseases, and weeds for the commercial 
production of fruit, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and ani-
mal products shall be wholesale sales. Also baling 
ties and twine for baling hay and straw and fuel sold 
to farmers and agriculture producers for use in heat-
ing orchards and providing power in off-highway type 
farm machinery shall be wholesale sales. 
B. Tangible personal property or services which are 
purchased by a manufacturer or compounder which 
do not become and remain an integral part of the 
article being manufactured or compounded are sub-
ject to sales or use tax. 
1. For example, sales to a knitting factory of ma-
chinery, lubricating oil. pattern paper, office supplies 
and equipment, laundry service, and repair labor are 
for consumption and are taxable. These services and 
tangible personal property do not become component 
parts of the manufactured products. On the other 
hand, sales of wool, thread, buttons, linings, and 
yarns, to such a manufacturer that do become compo-
nent parts of the products manufactured are not tax-
able. 
C. The price of tangible personal property or ser-
vices sold or the quantity sold are not factors which 
determine whether or not the sale is a wholesale sale. 
D. All vendors who make wholesale sales are re-
quired to obtain an exemption certificate from the 
purchaser as evidence of the nature of the sale, as 
required by Rule RS65-19-23S. 
R865-19-30S. Purchase Pr ice o r Sales Pr ice De-
fined P u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-12-102 a n d 59-12-104. 
A. "Fair market value" means the average trade-in 
value as shown in the appropriate published guide. 
1. Acceptable guides include: 
a) NADA Official Used Car Guide; 
b) NADA Official Older Used Car Guide; 
c) NADA Recreational Vehicle Guide; 
d) NADA Motorcycle, Moped, ATV Appraisal 
Guide; 
e) ABOS Intertec Publishing Company Marine 
Publications Division Guide. 
2. If a listing for any vehicle is not found in an 
acceptable guide, a certified value from the local 
county assessor's office shall be accepted as the fair 
market value for that vehicle. 
B. "Purchase price" and "sales price" may be used 
interchangeably. 
C. With the exception of vehicles purchased from 
licensed dealers, a person who purchases a vehicle 
required to be titled or registered and who pays the 
tax at the time of titling or registration is subject to 
the following provisions when calculating the sales or 
use tax due. 
1. If the seller of the vehicle has not received a 
trade-in vehicle the sales and use tax shall be calcu-
lated as follows: 
a) If the purchaser of the vehicle obtains a signed 
bill of sale from the seller of the vehicle, the amount 
of sales and use tax collected shall be based upon the 
sales price set forth in the bill of sale. The bill of sale 
must contain the names and addresses of the pur-
chaser and the seller and the sales price of the vehi-
cle. 
b) If the purchaser of the vehicle does not obtain a 
signed bill of sale from the seller of the vehicle, the 
amount of sales and use tax collected shall be based 
upon the sales price declared or stated by the pur-
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B. If a sale is an integral part of a business whose 
primary function is not the sale of tangible personal 
property, then such sale is not isolated or occasional. 
For example, the sale of repossessed radios, refrigera-
tors, etc., by a finance company is not isolated or occa-
sional. 
C. Sales of vehicles required to be titled or regis-
tered under the laws of this state are not isolated or 
occasional sales, except that any transfer of a vehicle 
in a business reorganization where the ownership of 
the transferee organization is substantially the same 
as the ownership of the transferor organization shall 
be considered an isolated or occasional sale. 
D. Isolated or occasional sales made by persons not 
regularly engaged in business are not subject to the 
tax. The word "business" refers to an enterprise en-
gaged in selling tangible personal property or taxable 
services notwithstanding the fact that the sales may 
be few or infrequent. Any sale of an entire business to 
a single buyer is an isolated or occasional sale and no 
tax applies to the sale of any assets made part of such 
a sale (with the exception of vehicles subject to regis-
tration). 
E. The sale of used fixtures,, machinery, and equip-
ment items is not an exempt occasional sale if the 
sale is one of a series of sales sufficient in number, 
amount, and character to indicate the seller deals in 
the sale of such items. 
F. Sales of items at public auctions do not qualify 
as exempt isolated or occasional sales. 
G. Wholesalers, manufacturers, and processors who 
primarily sell at other than retail are not making 
isolated or occasional sales when they sell such tangi-
ble personal property for use or consumption. 
R865-19-39S. Sales by Farmers and Agricultural 
Producers Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tions 59-12-102 and 59-12-104. 
A. The seasonal sale of crops, seedling plants, gar-
den, farm or other agricultural produce by the pro-
ducer thereof is not subject to tax. The exemption 
does not extend to the retail sale of seasonal products 
by anyone other than the producer thereof, and the 
burden of proof that any such sale is not subject to the 
tax is on the vendor. 
B. Poultry, eggs, and dairy7 products are not sea-
sonal products and are not exempt from tax if a pro-
ducer sells such products and his sales to consumers 
have an average sales value of $125 or more per 
month. 
C. If any farmer or other person who is an agricul-
tural producer establishes a place of business — such 
as a roadside stand, curb stand, market, stall, or 
other store — for the sale of seasonal crops which he 
has produced, and in addition sells agricultural prod-
ucts which he has purchased or otherwise acquired 
from some third party, he then becomes a retailer of 
the produce purchased or otherwise acquired and is 
subject to the provisions of the law with respect to 
collecting and remitting sales taxes upon such retail 
sales and filing returns. 
R865-19-40S. Exchange of Agricul tural P roduce 
For P rocessed Agricul tura l Products Pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-102. 
A. When a raiser or grower of agricultural products 
exchanges his produce for a more finished product 
capable of being made from the produce exchanged 
with the processor, the more finished product is not 
subject to the tax within limitations of the value of 
the rai^pH nmr^nna
 QV^kon^H 
R865-19-41S. Sales to The United States Govern-
ment and Its Ins t rumental i t ies P u r s u a n t to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. Sales to the United States Government are ex-
empt if federal law or the United States Constitution 
prohibits the collection of sales or use tax. 
B. In cases where the United States Government 
pays for merchandise or services with funds held in 
trust for nonexempt individuals or organizations, 
sales tax must be charged. 
C. Sales made directly to the United States Govern-
ment or any authorized instrumentality thereof are 
not taxable, provided such sales are ordered upon a 
prescribed governmental purchase order form and are 
paid for directly to the seller by warrant on govern-
ment funds. Vendors making such sales are required 
to retain purchase orders, voucher stubs, or like evi-
dence of governmental purchase and payment. How-
ever, where the sale is $100 or less, a signed certifi-
cate claiming governmental exemption by the buyer 
is acceptable evidence of exemption. 
R865-19-42S. Sales to the State of Utah and Its 
Subdivisions Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 59-12-104. 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such as 
counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property is for 
use in the exercise of an essential governmental func-
tion. If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn upon 
the state treasurer or the official disbursing agent of 
any political subdivision, the sale is considered as 
being made to the state of Utah or its political subdi-
visions and exempt from tax. 
R865-19-43S. Sales to or by Religious and Chari-
table Institutions Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 59-12-104. 
A. In order to qualify for an exemption from sales 
tax as a religious or charitable institution, an organi-
zation must be recognized by the Internal Revenue 
Service as exempt from tax under Section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code. 
B. Religious and charitable institutions must col-
lect sales tax on any sales income arising from unre-
lated trades or businesses and report that sales tax to 
the Tax Commission unless the sales are otherwise 
exempted by law. 
1. The definition of the phrase "unrelated trades or 
businesses" shall be the definition of that phrase in 
26 U.S.C.A. Section 513 (West Supp. 1993), which is 
adopted and incorporated by reference. 
C. Every institution claiming exemption from sales 
tax under this rule must submit form TC-160, Appli-
cation for Sales Tax Exemption Number for Religious 
or Charitable Institutions, along with any other in-
formation that form requires, to the Tax Commission 
for its determination. Vendors making sales to insti-
tutions exempt from sales tax are subject to the re-
quirements of Rule R865-19-23S. 
R865-19-44S. Sales In Interstate Commerce Pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. Sales made in interstate commerce are not sub-
ject to the sales tax imposed. However, the mere fact 
that commodities purchased in Utah are transported 
beyond its boundaries is not enough to constitute the 
transaction of a sale in interstate commerce. When 
the commodity is delivered to the buyer in this state, 
even though the buyer is not a resident of the ^tat* 
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side the state, the sale is not in interstate commerce 
and is subject to tax. 
B. Before a sale qualifies as a sale made in inter-
state commerce, the following must be complied with: 
1. the transaction must involve actual and physical 
movement of the property sold across the state line; 
2. such movement must be an essential and not an 
incidental par: of the sale; 
3. the seller must be obligated by the express or 
unavoidable implied terms of the sale, or contract to 
sell, to make physical delivery of the property across 
a state boundary line to the buyer. 
C. Where delivery is made by the seller to a com-
mon carrier for transportation to the buyer outside 
the state of Utah, the common carrier is deemed to be 
the agent of the vendor for the purposes of this sec-
tion regardless of who is responsible for the payment 
of the freight charges. 
D. If property is ordered for delivery in Utah from a 
person or corporation doing business in Utah, the sale 
is taxable even though the merchandise is shipped 
from outside the state to the seller or directly to the 
buyer. 
R865-19-45S. Auctioneers, Consignees, Bailees, 
Etc., Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-102. 
A. Every auctioneer, consignee, bailee, factor, etc., 
entrusted with possession of any bill of lading, cus-
tom house permits, warehousemen's receipts, or other 
documents of title for delivery of any tangible per-
sonal property, or entrusted with possession of any of 
such personal property for the purpose of sale, is 
deemed to be the retailer thereof, and is required to 
collect sales tax, file a return, and remit the tax. The 
same rule applies to lien holders such as storage men, 
pawnbrokers, mechanics, and artisans. 
R865-19-48S. Charge For Coverings and Con-
tainers Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-102. 
A. Sales of containers, labels, bags, shipping cases, 
and the like are taxable when: 
1. sold to the final user or consumer; 
2. sold to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or 
retailer for use as a returnable container which is 
ordinarily returned to them and reused by them in 
storing or transporting their product; or 
3. sold for internal transportation or accounting 
control purposes. 
B. Sales of nonreusable containers, labels, bags, 
shipping cases, and the like, when sold to a manufac-
turer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer for use in 
packaging tangible personal property which they sell, 
are not taxable. 
1. Nonreusable containers generally exempt from 
the tax include boxes, cartons, paper bags, labels, 
wrapping paper, and shipping cases of items being 
sold. 
C. Returnable containers that are ordinarily reused 
and subject to the tax include water bottles, carboys, 
drums, beer kegs for draft beer, dairy product con-
tainers, and gas cylinders. 
1. Labels used for accounting, pricing, or other con-
trol purposes are also subject to tax. 
D. For the purpose of this rule, soft drink bottles 
and similar containers which are ultimately de-
stroyed or retained by the final user or consumer are 
not considered to be returnable containers and are 
exempt from the tax when purchased by the proces-
sor. 
E. When a retailer sells tangible personal property 
in containers, such as soft drinks, and chooses to as-
sess a deposit or other container charge, such charge 
is subject tc the tax. Upon refund of this charge, the 
retailer may take credit on a sales tax return if the 
tax is refunded to the customer. 
R865-19-49S. Sales to F a r m e r s and Other Agri-
cul ture P r o d u c e r s P u r s u a n t to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. Farmers, market gardeners, commercial fruit 
growers, livestock feeders, poultrymen, nurserymen, 
beekeepers, dairymen, and similar agricultural pro-
ducers may purchase tax exempt for resale baling 
ties, baling twine, seeds, plants, trees, fertilizer, feed, 
breeding stock, eggs, stock salt, baby chicks, live-
stock, sprays, insecticides, and medicine and veteri-
nary supplies. 
1. These purchases are exempt only if purchased for 
resale or if the purchase is deemed to become a com-
ponent part of the raised product, as in the case of 
fertilizer, feed and medicine. 
2. These purchases are subject to tax if the property 
purchased is used by the farmer or is used to produce 
goods to be used or consumed by the farmer. For ex-
ample, seeds and seedlings are exempt if sold to 
farmers for use in producing a crop for sale, but are 
taxable if used for lawns, flowers, or crops to be used 
for personal consumption or any purpose other than 
sale. 
3. Feed is exempt if used to produce livestock, milk, 
butter, poultry, eggs, etc., for sale or to feed working 
dogs and working horses in agricultural use, but is 
taxable if used for pets or other animals not to be 
marketed. 
B. Fur-bearing animals, which are kept for breed-
ing, for their products, or for other useful purposes, 
shall be deemed agricultural products. Persons en-
gaged in raising fur-bearing animals, such as foxes or 
mink, are agricultural producers. 
C. Electricity, gas, coal, and other fuels are taxable 
when sold for general farm use; but fuel sold to agri-
cultural producers for use in heating orchards or op-
erating off-highway type farm equipment is exempt. 
D. Farm machinery, equipment, and supplies used 
primarily and directly in farming operations are ex-
empt from sales tax subject to the following provi-
sions: 
1. The exemption applies only to sales of tangible 
personal property used or consumed primarily and 
directly in commercial farming operations, as evi-
denced by the filing of a federal Farm Income and 
Expenses Statement (Schedule F) or similar evidence 
that the farm is operated as a commercial venture. 
2. The exemption does not apply to materials, ma-
chinery, equipment, and supplies, such as mainte-
nance and janitorial equipment and supplies that are 
incidental to farming, nor to hand tools with a unit 
price of less than $100. The exemption also does not 
apply to office equipment, transportation equipment, 
vehicles subject to state licensing requirements, 
equipment and supplies used in research and sales. 
E. Vendors making sales to farmers or other agri-
cultural producers are liable for the tax unless such 
vendor obtains from the purchaser a certificate as set 
forth in Rule R865-19-23S 
F. Vendors must also comply with the provisions of 
Rule RS65-19-88S. which requires reporting exempt 
sales on quarterly sales tax returns. 
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to waitresses and other employees, contest prizes 
given to salesmen, merchandise bonuses given to 
clerks, and similar items given away. 
R865-19-57S. Ice Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 59-12-102 and 59-12-103. 
A. In general, sales of ice to be used by the pur-
chaser for refrigeration or cooling purposes are tax-
able. Sales to restaurants, taverns, or the like to be 
placed in drinks consumed by customers at the place 
of business are sales for resale and are not taxable. 
B. Where ice is sold in fulfillment of a contract for 
icing or reicing property in transit by railroads or 
other freight lines, the entire amount of the sale is 
taxable, and no deduction for services is allowed. 
R865-19-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold to 
Owners, Contractors and Repairmen of Real 
Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-12-102 and 59-12-103. 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real prop-
erty contractors and repairmen of real property is 
generally subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or 
repair real property, regardless of the type of contract 
entered into — whether it is a lump sum, time and 
material, or a cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax 
nor is the labor performed on real property. For ex-
ample, the sale of a completed home or building is not 
subject to the tax, but sales of materials and supplies 
to contractors and subcontractors are taxable trans-
actions as sales to final consumers. This is true 
whether the contract is performed for an individual, a 
religious institution, or a governmental instrumen-
tality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable insti-
tutions and government agencies are exempt only if 
sold as tangible personal property and the seller does 
not install the material as an improvement to realty 
or use it to repair real property. 
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all ma-
terials and supplies from vendors who collect the 
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the 
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal 
property in addition to the work on real property. 
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall ob-
tain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales of 
tangible personal property to final consumers. 
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing 
contracts to improve or repair real property. Books 
and records must be kept to account for both material 
sold and material consumed. 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors for 
use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold in in-
terstate commerce in accordance with Rule 
R865-19-44S. 
D. This rule does not apply to contracts whereby 
the retailer sells and installs personal property which 
does not become part of the real property. See Rules 
R865-19-51S, R865-19-59S, and R865-19-7SS for in-
formation dealing with installation and repair of tan-
gible personal property. 
R865-19-59S. Sales of Materials and Services to 
Repairmen Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 59-12-103. 
A. Sales of tangible personal property and services 
to persons engaged in repairing or renovating tangi-
ble personal property are for resale, provided the tan-
gible personal property or service becomes a compo-
nent part of the repair or renovation sold. For exam-
ple, paint sold to a body and fender shop and used to 
paint an automobile is exempt from sales tax since it 
becomes a component part of the repair work. 
1. Sandpaper, masking tape, and similar supplies 
are subject to sales tax when sold to a repairman 
since these items are consumed by the repairman 
rather than being sold to his customer as an ingredi-
ent part of the repair job. These items shall be taxed 
at the time of sale if it is known that they are to be 
consumed. However, if this is not determinable at the 
time of sale, these items should be purchased tax free, 
as set forth in Rule R865-19-23S and sales tax re-
ported on the repairman's sales tax return covering 
the period during which consumption takes place. 
R865-19-60S. Sales of Machinery, Fixtures and 
Supplies to Manufacturers, Businessmen and 
Others Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-103. 
A. Unless specifically exempted by statute, sales of 
machinery, tools, and other equipment to a manufac-
turer, producer, or contractor and sales of furniture, 
fixtures, supplies, stationery, equipment, appliances, 
tools and instruments to stores, shops, businesses, es-
tablishments, offices, and professional people for use 
in carrying on their business or professional activities 
are taxable. 
B. Such sales are to final buyers or ultimate con-
sumers and are not sales for resale. 
R865-19-61S. Meals Furnished Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. The tax is imposed upon the amount paid for 
meals furnished by any restaurant, cafeteria, eating 
house, hotel, drug store, diner, private club, boarding 
house, or other place, regardless of whether meals are 
regularly served to the public. 
1. By specific exemption, the following meal sales 
are exempt from taxation: 
a. public elementary and secondary school meals, 
whether sold to students or the public; and 
b. inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing 
facilities. Tax must be paid on the purchase price of 
food by nonexempt medical or nursing facilities. 
2. Ingredients which become a component part of 
meals subject to tax are construed to be purchased for 
resale. 
B. Where no separate charge or specific amount is 
paid for meals furnished but is included in the mem-
bership dues or board and room charges; the club, 
boarding house, fraternity, sorority, or other place is 
considered to be the consumer of the items used in 
preparing such meals. 
C. Meals served by religious or charitable institu-
tions, and institutions of higher education are exempt 
from taxation only if the meals are not available to 
the general public. The term "available to the general 
public" is interpreted broadly so as to include any 
restaurant, cafeteria, or other facility where service 
is not restricted and monitored for a limited class of 
people. The following are guidelines for various types 
of meal sales: 
1. Exemption status of employee cafeterias is deter-
mined in large measure by the availability of access 
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MARK 0. MORRIS (A 4636) 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1904 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
VERMAX OF FLORIDA, INC., a ; 
Florida corporation, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
v.
 J 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) STIPULATION 
) Case No. 92-0318 
Petitioner Vermax of Florida, Inc. and Respondent Utah State Tax Commission 
hereby stipulate to certain facts for the purpose of facilitating submission of this matter. The 
factual record in this matter consists of those stipulations and admissions already made a part 
of the record herein, and evidence received at the May 3, 1993 evidentiary hearing in this 
matter. At that hearing, it was stipulated and agreed that Vermax provide further 
documentation in support of its claim. In lieu of that additional documentary evidence, the 
parties hereto stipulate and agree as follows: 
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1. As to each of the contracts identified by the State Tax Commission in 
Schedules 1 and 2 attached to the November 25, 1991 Statutory Notice, Vermax issued two 
separate bids to the prospective purchaser, each of which was located out-of-state. One bid 
was for the sale of product to be incorporated into buildings out-of-state. The second bid 
was for the installation of such product into the buildings out-of-state. 
2. For each contract set forth in Schedules 1 and 2, the purchaser accepted both 
bids of Vermax. Generally, Vermax then had the purchaser execute two separate contracts, 
one for purchase and the other for installation. When dealing with large general contractors, 
Vermax was usually required to sign a single, form contract. Whether separate or combined, 
the contracts required that Vermax deliver the products on-site and then be responsible for 
installation. 
3. For each installation bid included in the contracts set forth in Schedules 1 and 
2, Vermax subcontracted the installation obligations to on-site, out-of-state subcontractors. 
4. For each contract set forth in Schedules 1 and 2, unless the purchaser of 
Vermax products specified otherwise, Vermax invoiced the purchaser for product and 
installation as two separate items. 
DATED this / j ^ S a y of June, 1993. 
SNELL & WJLMER / 
Mark 0. Morris / 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
'Gail Fjrancis 
Assistant Attorney General 
ftnnrmnps 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
VERMAX OF FLORIDA, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
Appeal No. 92-0318 
Account No. D4 64 03 
Respondent. ) Tax Type: Sales Tax 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a formal hearing on May 3, 1993. Alan Hennebold, Administrative 
Law Judge, heard the matter on behalf of the Commission. Mark 0. 
Morris, of Snell & Wilmer, represented Vermax. Gale Francis, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General, represented the Auditing Division. 
After the hearing, the parties were permitted to submit 
additional evidence and argument. The last such material was 
received by the Commission on November 1, 1993. 
Based on the record in this matter, the Tax Commission 
hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1988 through 
December 1990. 
3. On November 25, 1991, the Audit Division assessed 
Vermax with additional sales tax in the amount of $63,134.51, 
r< f\ r\ r\ . r\ r\ 
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arising from three types of transactions: 1) Use of materials in 
real property contracts; 2) Sales made on an "exempt" without 
proper documentation; and 3) Purchases of personal property for use 
or consumption by Vermax. In addition to the tax liability, a 10% 
negligence penalty in the amount of $5,313.45 and interest were 
also assessed against Vermax. 
4. Vermax has filed a timely appeal of the foregoing 
assessment. 
5. Vermax manufactures, supplies and installs synthetic 
marble used for counter tops, showers and tubs. 
6. In the transactions at issue in this appeal, Vermax 
furnished and installed counter tops, showers and tubs for various 
customers outside Utah. Vermax did not collect sales tax on these 
transactions. 
7. During 1986, Vermax was also assessed for additional 
sales tax for failure to collect tax on "furnish and install" 
contracts. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act levies sales tax on the 
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for retail sales of 
tangible personal property made within the state. (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-103.) 
The Commission's Rule R865-19-58S provides in material 
part as follows: 
-2-
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A. Sale of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real 
property is generally subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the consumer of 
the personal property since he is the last one 
to own it as personal property. 2. The 
contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, 
alter or repair real property, regardless of 
the type of contract entered into - whether it 
is a lump sum, time and material, or a 
cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not subject 
to the tax nor is the labor performed on real 
property. For example, the sale of a 
completed home or building is not subject to 
the tax, but sales of materials and supplies 
to contractors and subcontractors are taxable 
transactions as sales to final consumers. 
This is true whether the contract is performed 
for an individual, a religious institution, or 
a governmental instrumentality 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors for use in out-of-state jobs are 
taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in 
accordance with Rule R865-19-44S. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401(3) levies the following penalty 
for failure to pay tax as due: 
(3) The penalty for underpayment of tax is as 
follows: (a) If any underpayment of tax is 
due to negligence, the penalty is 10% of the 
underpayment. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Vermax challenges the Auditing Division's assessment of 
tax on those transactions where Vermax has provided and installed 
materials in real property construction. 
-3-
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Vermax argues that the exemption found in Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-104(33) x should apply to Vermax's out of state "furnish and 
install" contracts. However, §59-12-104(33) did not become 
effective until after the audit period and does not apply to the 
transactions in question. 
Vermax additionally argues that its "furnish and install" 
contracts are exempt from Utah tax as being in "interstate 
commerce". The Utah Supreme Court considered the same argument in 
Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1990) . In Tummurru, the taxpayer manufactured modular units in 
Utah which its construction division then installed in real 
property outside the state. The taxpayer argued that it was not 
liable for Utah sales tax on the items taken from inventory for use 
in out of state construction projects. In response to that 
argument, the Court commented: 
Because Tummurru took possession of the 
items within the state of Utah and title 
passed within the state, it became the 
ultimate consumer for sales tax purposes. The 
fact that the items would be incorporated into 
real property located out of the state does 
not change the nature of Tummurru's consumer 
use of the items. 
The Court then proceeded to uphold the assessment of sales and use 
tax against the taxpayer. 
1
 Section 59-12-104(33) exempts sales within Utah of personal 
property to be incorporated into real property in another state, 
under certain conditions. 
-4-
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Vermax also contends that even if the transactions in 
question are subject: to Utah's sales and use tax, the amount of tax 
assessed is incorrect. However, Vermax has failed to provide any 
documentation or clear explanation on this point. 
Finally, Vermax challenges the imposition of a 10% 
negligence penalty against it. The Commission notes that several 
years ago, Vermax was assessed a sales tax deficiency for the same 
type of deficiency as is involved here. Under such circumstances, 
a 10% negligence penalty is appropriate. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission affirms the Audit 
Division's assessment of additional tax, penalty and interest. 
DATED this \& day of ^JMZUJL< , 1994 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
(AA 
W. Val Oveson 
Chairman 
~R5ge* p\ wrew 
Commissioner 
GLIU'U^ SaAAov 
Joe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
Alice Shearer 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.) 
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b.) 
beginning July 1, 1994, a Petition for Judicial Review by trial de 
novo in district court. (Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P). and 
Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601(1), 63-46b-13 (1) , 63-46-14 (3) (a)%) \.;,\\. 
AWsjA2-0318fbf /. / * - yC~ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that: I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision to the 
following: 
Vermax of Florida 
c/o Mark 0. Morris 
Snell & Wilmer 
111 East Broadway, Ste 900 
Salt Lake Cizy UT 84111-1004 
Kim Thorne, Director 
Auditing Division 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
Gale Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
50 South Main, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City UT 84144 
Craig Sandberg 
Deputy Director, Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
DATED this / ^ day of j^y/l^yirJ^ , 1994. 
